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Zimbabwe is a country imploding as a result of an unprecedented political and 
economic crisis which has existed over the last seven years. As the crisis deepens 
there are very low levels of protest in Zimbabwe. Debates about why Zimbabweans 
have not taken part in protests, despite what would seem like a conducive 
environment, have elicited diverse explanations ranging from popular fear of the 
regime, to the weakness of opposition leadership and the country's political culture. 
This study investigates the willingness of Zimbabweans to use protest participation as 
an alternative route to the democratisation of Zimbabwe. A set of theoretical 
determinants from the literature are tested against individual reports of protest 
participation usmg the Afrobarometer survey: Round 3. Explanations include 
economic, political, cultural, cognitive and collective action factors. The evidence 
from this study reveals that, while conventional wisdom would associate protest with 
the economically insecure, the unemployed and individuals who belong to the 
working class, in Zimbabwe protest potential is high among the urbanised, the young, 
professionals, educated and the economically secure. The study raises questions about 
the efficacy of the strategies of civil society and opposition in Zimbabwe to mobilise 
protest Zimbabweans, despite being marginalised and confronted with the most severe 
crisis, are not inclined to push for economic and political transformation. Could they 
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We cannot have a situation where people decide to sit in places not allowed 
and when police remove them they say no. We can't have that. That is a 
revolt to the system. Some are crying that they were beaten. Yes you will be 
thoroughly beaten. When the police say move you move. If you don't move 
you invite the police to use force. 
President Mugabe addressing delegates at the Zimbabwe Embassy in Cairo 
Egypt on the arrest, torture and mistreatment of 15 Trade Union activists, 
September 23 2006 
1. Problem 
Zimbabwe is going through one of the worst political crises of its history. Since the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI), the country has had only two political 
leaders, Ian Smith from 1964 to 1979 and Robert Mugabe from 1980 until today. Both 
leaders have ruled the country in a more or less a one party system and both have been 
embroiled in civil wars to destroy legitimate alternative political voices (Eppel, 2004). 
The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) government has 
progressively monopolised socio-political and economic space, resulting in the 
economic crisis that has affected Zimbabwe. 
The economic crisis has culminated in shortages of food, fuel, electricity, water and 
money (Kubatana .net, 2007). Official inflation was 7 634% at the end of July 2007 
(Zimbabwe Central Statistical Office, 2007). Inflation in Zimbabwe is the highest in 
the world and this has severely affected Zimbabweans who can barely afford health, 
education and social services (Kubatana.net, 2007) The purchasing power of the 
Zimbabwean dollar has fallen to 1953 levels, when an average person living in 
Southern Rhodesia had an income of US$760 per year, wiping away the gains of the 
past 54 years (Clemens and Moss 2005). The scale and speed of this decline has been 
unusual for a country not in a war situation and has been greater than those 
experienced during recent conflicts in Cote d' Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of 











On the political side there has been an increase in human rights abuses in the form of 
intimidation and arrests of the ruling party's political opponents, closure of 
independent newspapers and restrictions on political gatherings. This has been 
regarded as political intolerance on the part of the ruling ZANU -PF government. The 
failure of the government to respect court decisions, particularly during the land 
reform process, has provided another example of the government's failure to uphold 
the rule of law and property rights. It has also made the country unattractive to 
international investors. 
The crisis has resulted in a major decline in all forms of political participation. One of 
the major reasons for apathy during elections is the belief that elections are rigged and 
unfair. In these cases citizens have no confidence in their potential to influence the 
outcome of the elections. Wakatama (2002) captures this lack of confidence of 
Zimbabweans in the electoral system metaphorically: 
There is a team in government that says it wants to play ball but only 
according to its own rules, not the rules recognised and accepted 
internationally. It has also made it clear that anyone who might contemplate 
scoring a goal against it will be physically dealt with. Woe betide all, if it loses 
the game the referee, opponents and even the fans will be in danger of losing 
their lives (Wakatama, 2002, p.34). 
This perception most probably contributed to the progressive decline in voter turnout. 
Voter turnout has moved from a very high 94% of eligible voters in 1980 
parliamentary elections to 57% in subsequent legislative elections and from 53% in 
the 1990 presidential elections to 33% in 1996 (Chiroro, 2005). Despite a resurgence 
of electoral participation in 1999 and 2000, voter turnout plunged culminating in a 
turnout of 19% in last year's Senate elections, the lowest in Zimbabwe's history 
(Chiroro, 2005). In 2000, Zimbabweans were described as "unable to influence the 
political system and least likely of all Southern Africans to feel they can improve 
things through voting in elections" (Mattes, 2000, p.6). 
While the constitution of Zimbabwe guarantees individual freedoms, the existence of 
multiple parties and regular elections. Democratic space has shrunk dramatically over 
the last five years as peaceful protests and demonstrations have been effectively 










Access to Infonnation and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and Public Order and 
Security Act (POSA)2 The limitations placed on the media, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) and political parties have been exacerbated by the widespread 
use of state violence. Lebani (2004) argues that the use of state violence and 
repression is an example that protest of any kind will not be tolerated. 
Krieger (2005) argues that the level of repression prevailing in Zimbabwe diminishes 
the prospects of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) coming to power 
through elections or of effective civil society pressure on ZANU-PF to refonn itself. 
Thus different sectors of civil society and opposition political parties such as the 
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the National Constitutional Assembly 
(NCA), Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA) and the Movement for Democratic 
Change (MDC) now advocate protest as an alternative tool through which to trigger 
democratisation in Zimbabwe. While they have called for numerous protests, very few 
Zimbabweans have responded to these calls, resulting in the state owned media 
referring to them as "damp squibs" (The Herald Harare, 2006). 
Chikwanha-Dzenga, Masunungure and Madzingira (2001) conclude that the pervasive 
unhappiness in Zimbabwe has failed to trigger a wave of citizen participation in 
political life, whether peaceful or violent. There is an increasing reluctance among the 
population to engage in demonstrations or protest marches. As a result, mobilising a 
group of more than one hundred people is now a major task. Yet, as recently as 9 
December 1997, one million Zimbabweans took part in nationwide demonstrations 
Chuma, Raftopolous and Alexander, (2006). Why has this willingness to protest 
diminished even as the ZANU PF government becomes more repressive? Evidence 
from public opinion data collected by the Afrobarometer Project (Fig 1) presents 
individual Zimbabweans' attitudes towards participation in protest marches and 
demonstration. 
2 AIPPA (2002) demands the registration of journalists and media houses and grants the state power to 
investigate journalist's sources of information. POSA (2002) disallows gatherings of more than 5 
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Makanza (2006) lamented the missed opportunities to protest as she questioned: 
Why pro-democracy movements have not been able to capitalise on the so 
many reported failures of the ZANU PF government: Operation 
Murambatsvina (Restore Order), the failed land reform programme, the 
economy characterised by high inflation, high prices of basic food 
commodities, unemployment ... the necessary conditions needed for 
combustion to happen exist in Zimbabwe, what is needed is a spark ... why has 
there been no spark, despite numerous opportunities, that if presented 
elsewhere in the world would have brought a change of the ruling 
government? (Makanza, 2006, p.l) 
Debates about why Zimbabweans have not taken part in protest, despite what would 
seem like a conducive environment, have elicited diverse explanations ranging from 
popular fear of the regime, to the weakness of opposition leadership to the country's 
political culture (Ayittey, 2006). Chikwanha-Dzenga et al (2001) conclude that 
Zimbabweans have an underdeveloped culture of protest and active civic 
participation. Despite the fact that they are unhappy with the world in which they live, 
they are simply not oriented to breaking the law. They argue that Zimbabweans 
"respect and honour their obligations including onerous ones like heavy taxation, they 
are law abiding but joyless people" (Chikwanha-Dzenga, at e1200l, p.37). 
Kagoro (2005, p.l) however takes a different view of Zimbabwean culture. He argues 
that the absence of revolt in Zimbabwe despite unparalleled repression "is a result of 
ingrained capacity of Zimbabweans to constantly hope for a new day ultimately 
making them prisoners of hope". 
Yet a different explanation focuses on the high personal risks associated with 
confronting the regime. Protest is an unattractive option for most Zimbabweans, as the 
likely wrath of the ZANU PF government and its security forces makes it an 
extremely dangerous proposition (Chiroro, 2005). Masunungure (2006) explains that 
the "paradox of the overall situation of the multifaceted crisis is that as it worsens, the 
people directly affected become more and more impotent and demobilised". 
Meanwhile, the Zimbabwean government explains the lack of protest as an indication 
of people's happiness and satisfaction with its 'pro poor' policies such as the 











It argues that the calls for protest emanate from a few 'misguided people from the 
opposition' who have no support. However, these claims are disputed by the evidence 
from Afrobarometer (Fig 2) that shows sharp increases in proportions of 
Zimbabweans who are dissatisfied with the economy and high levels of disapproval of 
the performance of President Mugabe. 
This study explores these and other possible explanations for this apparent paradox. It 
will empirically assess the extent to which individual Zimbabweans have participated 
in and are prepared to participate in mass protest and demonstrations. Are 
Zimbabweans actually satisfied with what the government has done, both politically 
and economically or are they just opposed to protest in principle? Have they simply 
concluded that protest is either too risky or do they lack the institutional and cognitive 












LITERA TURE REVIEW 
While there has been longstanding scholarly interest in the factors that shape protest, 
there is still no clarity on the factors that cause it (Dalton and Sickle, 2005). Protest 
has been discussed from de Tocqueville's description of the French Revolution to 
Gurr's Why Men Rebel? (Gurr, 1970). 
2.1 What is Protest? 
On the one hand protest has been described as a tool that is used by the 
"disenfranchised and the politically frustrated to pressure government" (Dalton and 
Sickle 2005, p.1). On the other hand it has been portrayed as a tool that is used by 
those who are already active in politics (lnglehart, 1990, Norris, 2002). For example, 
in a cross-sectional study of protest in 70 nations using World Values Survey data for 
1999-2002 and 1995-1998, it was concluded that "people protest not because they are 
frustrated and excluded from politics but because they can protest and expect 
governments to respond (Dalton and Sickle, 2005, p.15)". People resort to protest if 
they are unable to correct a condition directly and resort to activities that draw 
attention to their grievances. Turner states that the method used is either to provoke 
ameliorative steps by some target group or to persuade a group to change (1969, 
p.816). Protest action expresses grievances and a conviction of wrong or injustice. 
Gamson (1990) asserts that protest can simply be viewed as an alternative way of 
participating in politics. The most common definition of protest is that it is an 
unconventional form of political action (Dalton and Sickle, 2005). It earns the label 
"unconventional" because protesters seek to influence social and political outcomes 
not through traditional channels of political participation such as voting, campaign 
contributions or petitions but by exerting pressure and demands outside of the 










Dalton and Sickle (2005, p.2) concur with the classification of protest as 
unconventional and state that protest "seeks to influence the course of social and 
political change from outside traditional institutions - for protest to be effective on 
public policy it has to disrupt normal politics". There are violent and non-violent 
means of protesting. These range from verbal protests to parades, marches, 
pilgrimages, picketing and vigils. In some instances, protesting can incite acts of 
violence, even deaths and military coups, which exceeds the "boundaries of tolerable 
politics in almost any political system and may reflect different causal processes" 
(Dalton and Sickle, 2005, p.2). In this paper, protest include methods such as stay-
aways, boycotts, closing businesses, attending demonstrations or protest marches. 
This study acknowledges that there have been other forms of protests by 
Zimbabweans through civil society bodies petitioning regional and international 
organisations such as The African Union (AU) and the United Nations Security 
Council (UN). Detailed reports of human rights violations have been produced to 
inform the world about the situation in Zimbabwe. The absence of independent 
newspapers and radio stations in the country has led to alternative sources of news 
being established outside the country. For example, newspapers such as New 
Zimbabwe. com, Zim Daily and Zimbabwe Times are all based abroad in the UK or 
Canada. Electronic media have been utilised, such as radio stations such as SW Radio 
and the Voice of America, broadcasting from Britain and the US respectively. Apart 
from these forms of protest, Zimbabweans have not yielded to calls for marches or 
boycotts to express their dissatisfaction. Critics of the government argue that the only 
form of pressure that can push the regime to reform is when people confront it 
directly. The political science literature offers five sets of factors that can be used to 
explain protest behaviour in Zimbabwe: the economic, political, cultural, collective 
action factors and cognitive awareness factors. (OUIT, 1970, Minkoff and Meyer, 











2.2 Theoretical Explanations 
2.2.1 Economicfactors 
Economic explanations of protest action focus on problems caused by changes in the 
national economy, such as inflation, recession and social deprivation, which in tum 
shape an individual's ability to be self sustaining (GUIT, 1970).There are three 
different types of economic explanations that can motivate protest. These factors 
focus on economic problems caused by sustained poor economic performance and 
absolute levels of unrnet grievances which cause "deprivation and dissatisfaction, in 
tum stimulating protest (GUIT, 1970, p.13). 
A second explanation focuses on relative unrnet grIevances. It argues that when 
people evaluate their present living conditions, it is important to consider the fact that 
their "point of reference may be their own past condition or an abstract ideal or 
standard articulated by a leader as well as reference group" (GUIT, 1970, p.13). When 
people perceive a discrepancy between what they feel they are entitled to and what 
they actually receive, they become more likely to take action (GUIT, 1970). A third 
type of economic factor focuses on people's future expectations. In this case, protest 
becomes more likely when people lose hope of being able to improve their personal 
circumstances. 
2.2.2 Political Factors 
The underlying premises related to political factors are not material conditions but 
whether or not people feel the configuration of political institutions allows them to 
influence the political system (Minkoff and Meyer, 2004). Protest is more likely in 
societies where there are few channels for citizens to access the political system 
(Kitsschelt, 1986: Cuzan, 1991). A closed political system is likely to "push actors 
outside conventional channels into the streets increasing levels and degrees of 
unconventional political action" (Dalton and Sickle, 2005, p.8). 
2.2.3 Cultural factors 
Culturally based explanations focus on the impact of human values on behaviour. 
Dalton and Sickle (2005, p.9), argue that "the political culture shapes the repertoire of 











Britain protest is gentrified and less common. Other scholars have argued that protest 
is far more common in Western democracies (Norris 2002; Inglehart and Catterberg 
2003; Inglehart and Wetzel ,2005). 
One branch of cultural theory argues that specific sets of cultural beliefs inhibit 
protest, for example Confucianism3. A different cultural explanation is based on 
modernisation theory which argues that modernisation produces a political culture 
that is more willing to question authority, to emphasise self expression and 
participation and to challenge established political elites Inglehart (Inglehart, 1990, 
Inglehart and Wetzel, 2005) argues that the pressure of post material culture 
characterised by questions of authority and emphasis on quality of life and self 
actualisation produces higher levels of protest. Advanced industrial societies also 
experienced the emergence of new social movements and a more active civil society, 
which advocates protest and, other forms of direct action. Meyer and Tarrow (1998), 
assert that processes of modernisation produce a social movement society where 
protests represent a conventional form of action. In contrast, traditional societies are 
often seen to be characterised by a subject political culture that emphasises respect for 
tradition. 
Cultural theory would argue that African culture is described as encouragmg 
passiveness and unquestioning loyalty to authority. Manguelle (2000,p.70) concurs 
that "it is difficult to explain the African passivity other than the fear inspired by a 
God hidden in the folds of the clothes of every African Chief'. Unfortunately, 
education has not liberated Africans from being subjects to being citizens as it 
produces individuals who are submissive, wary of risk and respectful of authority 
(Mamdani, 1996: Bratton, Mattes and Boadi, 2005). 
2.2.4 Collective Action Dilemma 
The collective action dilemma explanation states that when one feels economically or 
politically aggrieved, such grievances will tum into collective action only if people 
think that the action will be effective, and that participation will make a difference 












without entailing high personal costs. Oliver (1984) best captures this debate on 
protest participation in Zimbabwe when she questions 
Why some people are willing to make some real commitment of their time to a 
cause, while others give only token support or lip service? Are those who 
make the larger commitments simply those who are more interested in the 
collective goal and have more at stake in its provision? Do they have an 
unusually great faith in the willingness of their fellow citizens to back them up 
in their efforts? Are they people with a lot of spare time on their hands looking 
for a way to avoid boredom? Are they power hungry moguls exploiting 
community needs as an avenue to their own advancement? (Oliver 1984, 
p.601). 
Olson (1965,p.2) argues that "unless the number of individuals is quite small or unless 
there is coercion or some other special device to make individuals act in their 
common interest, rational, self interested individuals will not act to achieve their 
common or group interest." Such costs are typically seen to include personal effort, 
loss of wages and expenses to get to the protest site. In repressive political 
environments such as Zimbabwe costs include the possibility of arrest, severe 
beatings or death. Herbst (1990) concurs that in most African states the reason for 
classic collective action problems in organising protest is that individuals are deterred 
by the risks posed by confrontation with the government. 
If people feel that they will see the possibility of realising the potential benefits of 
protest without having to incur these potential costs they are not likely to take part in 
protest, giving rise to the "free rider problem" (Ostrom, 1990). Olson (1965, p.2) adds 
that "whenever a person cannot be excluded from the benefits others provide, each 
person is motivated not to contribute to the joint effort but to free ride on the efforts of 
others, if all participants choose to free ride the collective benefit will not be 
produced". 
The other cause for people to free ride is the repressive nature of the political system. 
In the prevailing environment in Zimbabwe, the risks are evidenced by high 
incidences of politically motivated human rights violations such as abductions, 
detention without charge and beatings. Opp and Roehl (1990) state that "there has 
been little effort however to develop propositions that explain the conditions in which 











protest action." Olson (1965, p.2) explains that "participation under repreSSIve 
conditions has a deterrent effect if no other costs and benefits of the punished 
behaviour changes." 
However a contrasting VIew is proffered by DeNardo (1985) who argues that 
repression can possibly increase the chances of people protesting when demonstrators 
become the victims of brutal repreSSIOn as their movement gains sympathy and 
material support from people who have not been exposed to the excesses. The 
possible public good to be derived from participating in protest in Zimbabwe has been 
articulated by civic leaders and opposition leaders as ushering in a new constitution, a 
change in political culture, economic growth and the emergence of a new leadership 
which could culminate in the country's readmission to the global economy. 
The other risks associated with protesting are influenced by one's economic status. 
O'Brien (1974, p.229) explains that "poor people are too concerned about survival to 
have time for leisure activities and their failure to participate in community 
organisations is not due to apathy but to an acute case of the free rider problem in 
which costs of participation outweigh some of the collective good." If poverty and 
repression illicit different responses to protest participation, what then explains the 
levels of collective action that we do see in the world? A possible answer relies on the 
resources provided by group membership. Belonging to a group decreases the costs of 
participating and decreases the chances that one might be the only "sucker" who pays 
the costs of participating through greater confidence in the fact that other group 
members will be there to provide solidarity. 
2.2.5 Cognitive Awareness 
Lastly, the cognitive explanation argues that regardless of whether one belongs to a 
group, collective action requires some minimal level of cognitive awareness of 
politics (Bratton, et aI, 2005). People have to be aware of the causes of their 
discontent to be able to blame government and have some sense that their 
participation will be meaningful and effective. Education, media use and cognitive 











Cognitive factors relate to peoples' knowledge of the world around them and the 
factors that enable them to have an informed opinion on the political and economic 
issues of the day (Bratton, et aI, 2005). This knowledge can be acquired because of an 
individual's education, media exposure, information interest and personal efficacy. 
The knowledge enables them to understand the power dynamics and how decisions 
that affect their lives are made (Bratton, et aI, 2005). 
At face value, one would expect low levels of information to decrease people's ability 
to connect their interests with political and economic reforms or to engage in effective 
demand on their own. From a completely opposite perspective Namate (2006) posits 
that Zimbabweans are too educated to throw stones or 'toyi toyi' in the streets and that 
"there is a belief in Zimbabwe that demonstrations are for township simpletons not 
those with an Ordinary level or above". 
2.2.6 Data 
To test these explanations, survey data from Afrobarometer Round 3 is used. 
Afrobarometer is an independent, nonpartisan research project that measures the 
social, political and economic atmosphere in Africa. Afrobarometer surveys are 
conducted in more than a dozen countries and are repeated on a regular cycle. The 
instrument asks a standard set of questions to allow systematic comparisons of 
countries. Trends in public attitudes are tracked over time. Results are shared with 
decision makers, policy advocates and civic educators, as well as average Africans 
who wish to become more informed and active citizens. The next chapter discusses 













3.1 Research Methodology 
This is a cross sectional micro level analysis derived from individual responses to 
questions in the Afrobarometer Round 3 survey in Zimbabwe. The empirical basis of 
this study measures protest activity by using Afrobarometer questions that ask 
respondents to describe their participation in previous forms of protest and whether 
they would participate in protests in the future. Between 9 and 25 October 2005, face-
to-face interviews were conducted with 1048 adult Zimbabweans by the Mass Public 
Opinion Institute (MPOI) in the country's three official languages: Shona, Ndebele 
and English. The target sample size was 1200 respondents, divided into two parts: a 
random (main sample) of 1096 respondents, and a purposeful sub-sample of 104 
respondents of Operation MurambatsvinaiRestore Order victims. 
The random sample was selected in four stages: selection of the primary sampling 
units (PSUs), starting points, households, and individual respondents. Because 
selection at each stage was conducted randomly, the main sample comprises a 
representative cross-section of the adult population of Zimbabwe aged 18 years and 
older. The sampling frame used was Zimbabwe's official 2002 national census data. 
For primary sampling units, a total of 137 census enumeration areas were randomly 
selected with probability proportionate to population size. These were stratified by 
province and by residential location (urban or rural). To ensure an equal 
representation of respondents by gender, interviews were alternated between male and 
female respondents. An additional 13 PSUs were selected for the sub-sample in three 
cities: Harare, Bulawayo and Mutare. Due to fieldwork-related disruptions, the full 
sample of 1200 was not achieved, but a total of 1112 interviews were successfully 
completed. These included 1048 for the main sample, and 64 for the sub-sample. The 
latter did not include any Harare interviews, which could not be conducted due to the 
interruption of fieldwork. For the main sample, the sample size is sufficient to yield 











3.2 Dependent Variable 
To measure protest potential a two item construct was created based on individual 
responses from Zimbabweans who indicated that they had participated in a protest or 
demonstration or in a stay-away.4 
3.3 Research Question 
What factors account for different levels of participation and willingness to participate 
in protests in Zimbabwe? 
3.3.1 Participation in Protest Demographics 
Afrobarometer survey results for 2005 revealed that 65% of the respondents indicated 
that they would never attend a demonstration or protest march, whereas 26% 
confirmed that they would protest if they had a chance. 8% of the respondents 
confirmed attending a protest march. A general assessment of protest participation in 
Zimbabwe reveals demographic variations in protest participation. While anecdotal 
evidence has indicated that citizens in urban areas are more likely to protest compared 
to rural areas, Fig 3 indicates minimal variation. There is a 1 % difference in the 
number of respondents from rural and urban areas who say they would never attend a 
protest or participate in a protest march. There is just a 7% difference for the 
respondents from both rural and urban areas who confirmed they would participate in 
future demonstrations if they have the opportunity. This evidence may challenge 
conventional assertions that urbanites are more predisposed to protest. 
4 The items measuring participation in protest and stayway are sufficiently correlated - Pearson's 
r=(.732**) and reliable Cronbach Alpha=(.23) to warrant creation ofa two item average construct of 
protest potential (n=1112) 
Question: Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citi::ens. For each of these. please tell 
me whether you personally have done any of these during the past year: Attended a demonstration or a 
protest march and taken part in a stay away a)No would never do this b)No would if had the chance 
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3.4.3 Cognitive factors 
Individual Zimbabweans who have limited access to public information and the media 
and have lower levels of formal education are less likely to protest. This is compared 
with individuals interested in public affairs and those who have access to the media 
and have high levels of interest. 
3.4.4 Economic 
Individual Zimbabweans who feel relatively deprived or who perceive their economic 
situation to be worse than others and unlikely to improve will be more willing to 
protest compared with those who are more satisfied with their economic situation. 
3.4.5 Collective Action 
Zimbabweans who do not belong to a civil society group and who fear the state are 
less willing to protest than those who belong to a group and do not fear the state. 
3.5 Limitations of Study 
U sing public opinion data has limitations because this data reflects individual's 
subjective views that can be influenced by wide range of factors, from the 
characteristics of the interviewer to the political and social environment. The 
Afrobarometer survey was conducted in an environment which was politically volatile 
and respondents might not have freely expressed their views regarding political 
matters for fear of future reprisals. However an assessment of the impact of fear on 
respondents indicates that there is no evidence to suggest this. Respondents were 
asked in the very last question who they thought the sponsor of the survey was. 
Responses revealed that, regardless of whether they thought the survey was 
government or privately funded, 8% of respondents indicated that they had 
participated in protest action. This indicates that responses to thc survey were not 
compromised by fear. Despite the margin of error inherent in this methodology, the 
data can provide to a large extent an indication of Zimbabweans' predispositions to 











3.6 Data Analysis 
Wherever possible, valid and reliable multiple item measures of relevant concepts 
were constructed in order to test these hypotheses. Multiple regression analysis is used 
to test empirical connections between these indicators and measures of protest 
•• . 5 
partlcipatIOn . 
3.7 Significance of Research 
Most of the literature on Zimbabwe has assessed political participation by reference to 
levels of voter turnout or through the statements and actions of organised groups such 
as the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the National Constitutional 
Assembly (NCA), Women of Zimbabwe Arise (WOZA), the Save Zimbabwe 
Campaign and political parties. But this literature tells us very little about what 
individual Zimbabweans think about protest. Yet the strategies of organised groups 
need to be based on an accurate picture of public predispositions. Are citizens ready to 
shift en-masse toward protest as a way to effect democratic change? Or will groups 
that pursue such strategies meet discontent, apathy or fear, and thus poorly attended 
protest marches or strikes? 
5 
Multiple regression analysis allows us to find linear combinations of independent variables that 
maximally predict a dependent variable. From this we can gauge the relative contribution of variables 
in the combination and can use the combinations to predict a value on the dependent variable for 













The acceleration of economic collapse signifies an end game for President 
Mugabe and the country ... the first phase of the countries' liberation is coming 
to an end as the economy is collapsing ... we are closer to seeing change in 
Zimbabwe today from within than at any time since Independence 
(Christopher Dell US Ambassador Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Online News 
Agency, 18 June, 2007) 
4.1 The Decline of Zimbabwe's Economy 
In Chapter two it was pointed out that economic factors are often seen by political 
scientist as a determinant of individual participation in protest. These factors include 
absolute deprivation, relative deprivation or anticipated future declines in personal 
living standards. If the economic school of protest is correct one would expect to find 
that Zimbabweans who view themselves as absolutely deprived due to the impact of 
the economy on their personal livelihoods are more likely to protest. More so, one 
would expect that people who perceive their economic situation to be worse than 
other Zimbabweans are more likely to protest. The rest of this chapter briefly gives 
an overview of the decline of the Zimbabwean economy and proceeds to assess the 
impact of the economic changes on the attitudes of individual Zimbabweans. 
The current economic decline in Zimbabwe stands in sharp contrast to the economic 
situation of the early 1980s when the government was credited with extending social 
services previously designed to cater for minority whites to the majority of 
Zimbabweans. Davies (2002, p.22) explains that "at independence there was rapid 
expansion in the education system and improved access to both preventative and 
curative health with some notable successes". The government introduced free and 
compulsory education, and introduced massive expansion in secondary schools and 
teacher training. It further undertook to improve community primary health care 
through large investments in hospitals and clinics" (Gatsheni, 2002). The working 
class also benefitted from minimum wage legislation which raised wages. There was 
also deliberate accelerated advancement of Africans in different professions 











However, within 10 years of independence the government of Zimbabwe was 
financially broke. "Contrary to the 3.4% annual growth in this period, the crisis 
deepened as growth contracted by 6.1 % in 2000, 4% in 2001 and further dropped by 
5% in 2002 (Lloyd, 2002, p.222)". Zimbabwe's economy has contracted in real terms 
in the past seven years. Inflation is in quadruple digits and the local currency has lost 
99% of its value. Almost half of the country faces shortages of fuel, cash, and 
electricity, cooking oil, sugar and drugs. Up to one quarter of the population has fled 
the country, comprising mostly skilled labour such as teacher's doctors and nurses. It 
is estimated that close to three million Zimbabweans are outside the country with 
most of them living in the United Kingdom and South Africa (Bloch, 2006). 
The multifaceted crisis can be attributed to factors such as the mismanagement of 
state owned companies by ruling party officials, poor economic policies and bad 
governance (Sachikonye, 2003). The crisis can also be credited to the IMF inspired 
Economic Structural adjustment programmes (ESAP) introduced by the government 
in the 1990s. With the worsening of the economic situation, the government sought 
assistance from multilateral donor agencies whose support was attached to demands 
for economic reforms designed to reduce the role of the government in the economy 
and promote private enterprise. It was asked to liberalise the economy, reduce 
subsidies to state owned companies, abolish import and export licenses and devalue 
the currency. These reforms led to the closure of companies, high unemployment, 
accelerated inflation and increased labour strikes and riots, (Maclean 2002; 
Sachikonye, 2002). This was further worsened by "huge unbudgeted payoffs of above 
5 billion Zimbabwe dollars to war veterans who sought compensation for their role in 
the liberation struggle (Sachikonye, 2003, p.14)". To add to the crisis 11 000 troops 
were dispatched to fight in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) which further 
strained the government's budget (Maclean, 2002). 
Finally, the government land reform programme contributed to economic decline as it 
led to disruptions in the tobacco market, an important source of foreign currency. 
(Clemens and Moss, 2005) The current political turmoil within Zimbabwe has 
increased the risk of investing in Zimbabwe such that most organisations and donor 
agencies have either relocated or withdrawn their support from Zimbabwe (Clemens 











However, the Zimbabwean government has laid the blame for the crisis on foreign 
'sanctions'. It has frequently claimed that there are external forces with an agenda to 
destabilise the government, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
British government (Clemens and Moss, 2005). The government of Zimbabwe has 
claimed that it is facing sanctions while the West refutes these claims and argues that 
the sanctions are imposed only on individuals working with the ruling party. 
A further explanation given by Mugabe's government for the crisis is drought. The 
government has claimed that the United States (US) is able to control the weather in 
order to cause drought. On the face of it, the argument of drought as the source of the 
crisis appears credible, since most of Zimbabwe's economy is based on agriculture. 
Yet a study by Richardson (2005) using data from Zimbabwe's Meteorology 
Department has shown that this argument does not hold up under evidence. The 
evidence indicates that the drought suffered during 2000101 was about 22% below 
average and less severe than at least other recent low rainfall periods. Since 1948, 
there has never been a situation where an important drop in rainfall in Zimbabwe's 
maize producing regions was not associated with corresponding drop in production in 
neighbouring Zambia and Malawi (Richardson, 2005). Countering this historical 
pattern, Zimbabwe's decline in maize production has been dramatically greater than 
its neighbours over the past five years. National maize production fell 74 percent from 
1999 to 2004, while in Zambia it actually increased (Richardson, 2005). Thus 
Zimbabwe's bad weather does not sufficiently account for its economic collapse. 
The most plausible explanation of the current crisis in Zimbabwe is misrule by the 
current government. The policy of land seizures and chaotic disruption on the farms is 
the main reason that staple maize production fell by three quarters. Zimbabwe now 
requires massive food aid as a result of the undermining of property rights and absurd 
macroeconomic management. Mills (2007) argues that Zimbabwe has moved from 
being a breadbasket into being a basket case as political troubles, combined with the 
abandonment of sound economic policies, have closed off access to foreign aid, 
scared away most foreign investment, and driven much of the skilled workforce out of 
the country. Clemens and Moss (2005) further explain that it can hardly be a 
coincidence that the economy began its precipitous fall just as the ruling party 











opposition. With the escalation of the cnSIS III Zimbabwe, donors have cut off 
international aid and withdrawn hundreds of millions of dollars (Goldsmith, 2001). 
4.2 The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Individual Zimbabweans 
Sachikonye (2003) explains that the economic crisis in Zimbabwe has resulted in an 
increase in the proportion of Zimbabweans living below the poverty datum line from 
40% of the population in 1990 to above 80%. According to the IMF report of October 
2005, the human cost of the government's policies in Zimbabwe has been very high 
as the country's human development indicators, once among the best in Sub Saharan 
Africa, have deteriorated sharply to rank 14th out of 177 countries in the World. 
More than four out of five Zimbabweans are currently unemployed. There has also 
been a massive increase in the price of basic commodities such as sugar, bread, 
transport and cooking oil of between 90% and 260% (Consumer Council of 
Zimbabwe, 2007). The Afrobarometer survey confirms the impact of the crisis over 
the last seven years on individual Zimbabweans. The evidence illustrates that people 
are frustrated with the performance of the economy and are equally dissatisfied with 
the performance of President Mugabe. With such severe economic hardships one 
wonders at what point such frustration would spur people to demonstrations and 
protest. 
The views of Zimbabweans were sought to assess a set of economic explanations 
derived from political science literature that might possibly shift people's 
predispositions to protest participation. These explanations include absolute poverty, 
relative deprivation and expectations of possible improvement of their livelihood in 
future. 
4.2.1 Absolute Deprivation 
To measure the impact of absolute deprivation on Zimbabweans' protest potential the 
Lived Poverty Index developed by Mattes, David's and Bratton (2003) was used. The 
model was constructed based on the 1995 World Summit definition of absolute 











human needs, including food, safe drinking water, sanitation facilities, health, shelter, 
education and information. It relates not only to income but also to access to services 
(World Summit, 1995). While there is no consensus within the literature on the most 
effective measures of lived poverty, Sen (1999) argues that there is an irreducible core 
of absolute deprivation in our idea of poverty which translates manifestations of death 
by starvation, malnutrition and visible misery into a diagnosis of poverty. The Lived 
Poverty Index measures individual responses to questions of well being. This index 
consists of seven items considered basic necessities: a cash income, food, medical 
treatment, home fuel, water, electricity and home safety6 (Mattes, et aI, 2002). The 
scale was interpreted as a composite measure of lived poverty based on the ability to 
extract a single valid and reliable measure of lived poverty. In the table below (Fig 5) 
fuel and shelter are the items most weakly correlated with a factor loading of B of 
(.41) and (.46) respectively. 
The items most strongly correlated are food (.63), medical treatment (.73) and school 
expenses (.69). The results (in Fig 5) show that the highest number of respondents 
indicated that they had "Always" or "Several Times" gone without basic items such 
as cash income (97%) transport (91 % ) school expenses for children (90%). There are 
possible explanations to the high confirmations of the shortage of cash and transport. 
These responses reflect cash shortages in the country and the unavailability of fuel as 
a result of the shortage of foreign currency. The two items on which respondents went 
without least are shelter (29%) and fuel to cook food (54%). 
6 The scale was confirmed verified through statistical procedures known as Factor analysis (using 
Maximum Likelihood extraction and Direct Oblimin Rotation and Reliability Analysis. From these 
items it is possible to extract a single variance unrotated factor with an Eigenvalue of 2. 71 that explains 
35percent of the common variance. The items load on or correlate with the underlying factor as 
follows transport (.44) cash income ( .63) food (.73) medical treatment (.53) home fuel water (.44) 
and school expenses (.69) .The scale is reliable ( Cronbach"s Alpha = .74) Factor analysis is a 
statistical technique that allows the condensation of complex sets of inter-relationships between several 
or many variables in terms of a simpler underlying structure. The general aim of factor analysis is to 
reduce the complexity of mUltiple observed variables in terms of a simpler, underlying dimensional 
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()uesI!O+1; Otw Ih~ puSI yeur, h""l' ojien, if ".',-r, hu" " yo" 01- a'l)'one ill your /~m ily SOlie »'ilhuUl_ 
~noMgh juod lu eal_ gone ~-ilhuUI Iramp<Jr(_ gone ~'it!wul ><'h",,1 expen,,",', !«(me ",ilhow fu.'1 to ('(10k 
food, !(Oll'< ",ifhuul dean ",,,Ier, swe ~-ill",w udr illwm~, Ii(~'" ".-illrout md,,-in~ and yon., ",ithout 
,hdfer al oVen .. hl.lu,\'1 On,'. (;," T".-i<-~ d .1'.".,,,,1 "lim.,., d) Mar!>' Time.\ ej I/W(1)',f) D(m '( too\j' 
A bi,-ariate correlation of ahsolute poverty and prolest reveals that it is IlH>derately 
and negativdy rdated to protest potential (l' eaN1Il r- _LHH)'_ This iIluicates 
absolute deprivation reduces protest potentiaL 
4.1.2 Relative Depr;mt;Oll 
l'h" SCCOIlU cconomic ",,"planation ol'prolcst focuses OIl relalive rather Ih~n absolute 
depri\' ation, rhi, is ",h<..'11 ~ person feels lh~ t their h\'ing ~o"dilJons ~re worse 
compared 10 others_ Rel~\i\'e uepr i' alion is uelineu as Ihe "posilion of ,I person or 
family in relation 10 others in the community or 10 ~ st~" d~rd com;idered lle<:essary for 
' ]hc vallLes of the co-effieien l ran!,e h '>Il' -] to +] wilh 0 irx]icating no rcl"tio(1,hip. ·j I indiC'",ing, 
l">si livc rcialiorbhip ,,><I -I indimling . "" galive r,: I"lion,hip_ V"iLK" do,", to _I or 1 I indic'''"" moog 
rc l at~rn'hip oclwcerr lhe' lWo ",i:>l1l', "rKl \'"Ioc', "In,c to 0 indic"tc . \w., Tchtic""hip betw •• n the 
two ,a,i,hb, 11 is i"'p"narl! to "'rk lhat ,,,,,relmi,,,, d,,,",, r">l C4""1 c.u,"tion, h"l il-Ihcy "'e nnL 










living in their society. Thus the position of different individuals and groups are 
considered in relation to others in a specific universe (Ruinciman, 1966, p.24)". 
In order to operationalise relative deprivation the question from the Afrobarometer 
survey that asks respondents how they rate their living conditions compared to those 
of other Zimbabweans was used. Previously Zimbabwe boasted a high quality 
education system that produced exceptionally qualified personnel and supported a 
vibrant economy. However there are now glaring disparities in terms of lifestyles in 
the country regardless of whether or not people possess these skills. This can be 
attributed to the erosion of personal income levels by the harsh economic 
environment. It can also be interpreted as a result of some people benefitting from the 
system of patronage that has been put in place by the government through the 
numerous government agricultural schemes meant to assist new farmers. Others are 
able to participate in the informal economy legally or otherwise. The Afrobarometer 
survey confirms that 60% of the respondents indicated that they felt that their living 
conditions were worse or much worse than other Zimbabweans compared to only 
16% who felt that their situation was better (Fig 6). The bivariate correlations reveal 
that individuals attitudes of relative deprivation have a strong and positive correlation 
with protest participation (Pearson R= .325). Absolute deprivation reduces protest 
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4.2.3 Fumre Expectations 
An 'Iltern'ltive expJ~n'ltion would hold thm reg'lrdless of people's .lctuJI or reimj,.-e 
perceived deprivation. what really matters for protest is tileir projected well being in 
the fllture. The Afruo'If{:>mder sur\'C} resilits indicme thm while individllJI 
Zimbabweans indicate having gone withOilt b~sic necessities. they 'Iiso confirm thJl 
they do nOl Jnticipale .my positive ch.mges in the futllre ~nd this disilillsionmenl CJIl 
be seen 10 increase their frustrations, 
To measure the views of limbJbwe~ns on whJt the fUlure h~s in store fur lhem 
Ali-ob'lrumeter Jsked: "Luuking Jhead (Iu YOIl expect }uur jiving condiliuns lu be 
beller ur worse in 12 months limeT' 85% uf Ihc respundents 10re~'lst (h~ 1 Iheir 
si(UJlion cUllld be wurse. G% respondenls felt il "uuld rem~in the same and only 7% 











Figure 7: Future "'f'<,tation, in Ziw,bab" . in 200~ 
Future Expectations 
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Ihi' cowm'Y ;n rMi .... ",,,,,,hs I;me? ~! J{"ch woru b, Worse c) Sa",e d) Bma) Much t.>IW fj don ', 
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The expl~n~tion for such high pessimism might be based on Zimbabweans' 
disS<ltisfaction ,,·ith gov~mmenl l'rogr~mme~. Th~ lack of oplimism might be 
~xacerbakd by the la~k of confid~nce in th~ kao.krships' c~pacity to tum around the 
~conomic downlurn h".s~u Oil lhe gov~mment"s tra~k ""cord. There is a ;;(rollg 
bi "arial~ correlation bet w~~n future ~xpec(aljon' and pmte~t (P~~rson T- 21 7*'). Thi, 
indic~k~ lhal anlicipation of change in th ~ fulure increase~ pmtCl1t polen ti al. 
4.2,4 Employment Status 
Th~ olh~r pos~ibk faclor tha( u~knn i ne~ protest part icipalion is one'~ employment 
statu~. CoO\~n lional "i"uom stales lhat if a person i~ unemployed tbe chances of (hem 
d~nl()n,(rating ar~ higb be~au~e of thls(mlion, c~u~ed hy ~nl<lrc~u i ukn~s~. The 
evid~n~~ from (he Afrob~mmd~r SUT\-ey (Fig g) re,,~akd tbal 7g% oflbe r~spondents 
were not ~rnployed ~olnpar~d (0 2~% "ho confinn ~ d being ~mployed. Th~ hivariak 
correlation between ~mployment ",nu prolest shows lhat there is a signilicant positive 
relationship (pearson 1'=. 132**). This me",ns employed people arc more likely (0 










t igLlrr 8: [mplo~ mom , I.W. Lilli O' OW< 2005 
Employment status Zimbabwe 2005 
Notcmploycd Employ~d 
Qu~,-'inn_ D() you !!m-e u job fh~f pap m,!! Inmm,,:-' /,- it fyI/ lime or part lime • Ar~ you pre,emlv 
IO<Jkin7fiJr ajon (,~'~n I(YO" ar~ presently wori:ing) :' 
4.2.5 R,xeil'iI'g M"ney from the Diu_'pora 
The crisis in Zimbab"e has resulted in a massive hrain drain with. the most ski lled 
citizens emigrating in search of employment in other cowltr ies. \oVith toc duline of 
the economy more and more people are scnding moncy homc to support families. 
lo.10rc enterprising Zimbabweans h;lve cstablished faci lities to bllY una\ailable 
groccries and fllel for relatives at home through nctworks based in the Diaspora. 
While 14% of Zimbahweans acknowledged receiving money 86% did not recci\e 
money from thc Diaspora. A correlation r.etwccn I'uciving moncy from abroad and 
protest potclll ial indicates a significant and positively re la ted link to protest potential 
(Pearson R = .1 22*'). rhlls individmls who receivcd money from the Diaspora are 











Zimbabweans receiving money from diaspora 
2005 86 
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Queslion. ComiJaing ,,/lihe ~Cli\'ilie_, JOU eng~ge 10 .re.we a lIvelihood _ ~'hi"h "Ilhe jiJllowing Ju 
Y"U do n() ~" Ifh'" ~b()"1 SIX mom!.\' ~g()? Receiving money/rom lami!,' member.' wIJrkirrg in o{her 
(vUnirid ' 
4.3 Multiva riate Regression 'lode! Economic Explanlltions and 
protest participation 
Having review~d the bivariate associations of ~con(lmic factors and protest bchmiollr_ 
it is ncc~ssary to c(l!\sidcr the joint relative clTcel of all economic fadors A 
com~incd mlllti yarialC model of c~ooomi L c~plan aliow. is Slali"li~<llly si t,'T1i li~anl, but 
explains only 7% of the variations in protest parli ~ i palion_ Th~ most important 
cconOrniL fador is ~!T\pl"ymenl (Rcla- 2.,9) and ab,,,lule <.kpri\· alion (Gela - -, 1 :i 7). 
Whereas one's employmenl stalus innea.ws prole~l pOlentiaL ahsolule depn " lIion 
redtL~es lhat p<',lcnliai. Recei\'ing !T\(mey ];-mn relalive, in lhe Dia'p')ra is il ISl) 











Table 1: Regression Model 
R B Beta Stat Significance 
Constant .300 000 
Absolute deprivation -.133** -120 -.157 .000 
Relative Deprivation .325** .016 .014 .692 
Future Expectations .217** .026 .019 .541 
Employment .132** .442 .239 .000 
Diaspora support .122** .208 .092 .007 
Adjusted R square (071) (n= J 112) 
The beginning of this chapter presented the hypothesis that attitudes of economic 
decline such as absolute deprivation, relative deprivation and pessimism about the 
future can motivate respondents to protest. However the evidence illustrates that 
absolute deprivation deters protest in Zimbabwe. Being employed, and receiving 
support from the Diaspora increases protest potential among Zimbabweans. The 
evidence counteracts the conventional view that protest is a weapon of the 
dispossessed and the downtrodden. Protest in Zimbabwe tends to be a vehicle of 
dissent for the relatively economically secure. 
Chapter 5 exammes political determinants of protest participation and assesses 














We hear others say we want to go into the streets to demonstrate, to unseat a 
legitimately elected government. It will never happen and we will never allow 
it. If a person now wants to invite his own death, let him go ahead (Robert 
Mugabe, 30 May, 2006 from ZHRF Report 2007) 
Dalton (2006), states that democracy requires an active citizenry. Without public 
involvement in the process democracy lacks both legitimacy and its guiding force. 
The inability of citizens to participate through conventional methods such as voting 
has raised questions about the legitimacy of the current political leadership in 
Zimbabwe. The previous chapter explored the economic determinants of protest and 
demonstrations. This chapter tests a set of political explanations specifically 
individual's attitudes about the accessibility of Zimbabwe's political institutions. The 
political science literature argues that individual's decisions to protest are determined 
by perceptions of the accessibility of a country's political institutions. The study 
expects to find that individuals who feel that their elected representatives, members of 
parliament and councillors are responsive will protest and demonstrate. Those who 
feel that Zimbabwean elections are not free and fair are more likely to participate in 
protest or demonstrations. 
The chapter will gIve a brief description of the nature and climate of political 
participation in pre- and post-independence Zimbabwe. It will further assess the 
opinions of individual Zimbabweans towards the accessibility of their political 
institutions. The focus is on the channels of communication and their ability to allow 
people to express their grievances and participate in defining societal goals. The 
chapter concludes with a regression model to establish the relationship between 
Zimbabweans' stated satisfaction with democracy, the state's respect for personal 
freedoms, leadership responsiveness and the effectiveness of the electoral system and 











5.1 Political participation 
5.1.1 Political Participation in Pre-Independence Zimbabwe 
Under white minority rule Zimbabwe's black people were not allowed to participate 
in political affairs. Gatsheni (2002, p.124) argues that "pre-colonial societies were 
characterised by non-competitive politics for power. Black people were relegated to 
forms of behaviour and associations that did not threaten the state, such as burial 
societies, co-operatives and religious groups. Organisations such as trade unions, 
teachers unions and student bodies were banned together with political parties." Moyo 
(1993) concurs with this view and asserts that: 
Public institutions were notoriously not accountable to the general public, 
there was no due process of law and the law was against the majority of the 
people (Moyo, 1993, p.l 0). 
These undemocratic tendencies in the colonial government inevitably permeated the 
liberation movements. According to Bhebhe and Ranger (2003, p.2), "nationalist 
movements were not only positive schools of democracy and human rights but were 
also negative schools of despotism, authoritarianism and violence". Thus, when they 
took power the new Zimbabwean leaders did not provide an environment conducive 
to open participation. The government made efforts to improve provisions of social 
services such as health and education, but conspicuously failed to open political 
institutions or repeal repressive state security laws. 
5.1.2 Political participation in Post- Independence Zimbabwe 
The first significant incident of intolerance became evident in 1981 through the state 
sanctioned massacre of about 20 000 civilians in the Midlands and Matabeleland to 
counter opposition to ZAPU PF8. Over the years, the levels of repression have 
intensified and manifested themselves in different forms. One such example is the 
state's use of the army and police to pacify restive labour and student protests. 
8 Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace & Legal Resource Foundation reports titled "Breaking the 
Silence" the massacre was done under the guise of maintaining state security. The process was 
motivated by a need to eliminate the opposition political party of Joshua Nkomo that threatened the 











On the 20th of April 1989, addressing the second judicial colloquium on the domestic 
application of International Human Rights Norms held in Harare, Robert Mugabe 
stated that: 
Human rights and fundamental freedoms allow us to fully develop and use our 
human qualities, intelligence, talents and conscience to satisfy our spiritual 
and other needs. It follows, therefore that the denial of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms is not only an individual and personal tragedy but also 
creates conditions of social and political umest, sowing seeds of violence and 
conflict within and between societies and nations (Zimbabwe Human Rights 
NOO Forum [ZHRF], 2007, p.35) 
Unfortunately, despite extolling such virtues in public, the Zimbabwean president has 
not changed the institutional and legislative framework for citizens' participation. The 
government has maintained laws that restrict the development of opposition political 
parties, the media and civic society. Moyo (1993, p.1) argues that "black 
nationalists ... used their political power to maintain, and in some cases to expand the 
oppressive legislation used by the colonial regimes to suppress the political activities 
of Black Africans". The ruling party exploited the repressive legislation and the 
underdeveloped culture of participation and pushed the society towards a one party 
state with the ultimate intent to absorb all groupings under ZANU PF. 
5.2 Political and Civil Liberties in Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe's civil society has evolved in an environment with a deeply entrenched 
culture of intolerance, partly inherited from the "guerrilla armies" and "nationalist 
parties" that were undemocratic, highly commandist and authoritarian (Oatsheni, 
2002, p.:103). However, the emergence of Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programmes in the late 1990s and its their impact on the economy saw the surfacing 
of a vibrant labour movement. This was exacerbated by the failure of the government 
to manage the economy and its abuse of human rights. Thus the political environment 
in Zimbabwe since 2000 has been highly polarised as both political parties, the ZANU 
PF and MDC, contest for state power. Sylvester (1995) refers to the political setting in 
Zimbabwe as a "terrain for intense contest with those already in the state doing 











He further states that "some sections of civil society in Zimbabwe view the present 
government as quite evil, using dirty tricks to maintain the status quo and also 
perceive the government as above the law and the master opposer of opposition 
(Sylvester, 1995, pA09)". 
The government has promulgated legislation over the years targeted at curtailing the 
activities of the labour movement, students and nongovernmental organisations. These 
include: 
1. the Labour Relations Amendment Act (2000) controls the activities of 
labour organisations and places them under the total control of the state;9 
2. the University of Zimbabwe Amendment Act (1990) provides for the 
arbitrary expulsion of students and members of staff for political reasons; 10 
3. the Private Voluntary Organisations Act (PVO Act,1995) monitors and 
controls the activities of civil society formations; 11 
4. The Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) (2002) 
violates journalists' rights .. It requires the registration of journalists and 
media houses and grants the state power to investigate journalists' sources 
of information 12 
5. The Public Order and Security Act (POSA,2002), outlaws gatherings of 
more than 5 people without police clearance. This ensures that the state has 
control of meetings held and can manage or even deny activities such as 
protests that are perceived to be anti-government. 13 
Public sentiment against the state has continued to nse with the escalation of 
violations of freedoms of association, expression, assembly and movement in an 
attempt by the state to regain lost control. A Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum 
(ZHRF, 2006) report confirms that 2006 freedom violations were markedly worse 
than the 2005 violations of freedoms (ZHRF, 2006). Trend analyses of violations of 
individual freedoms over the years show that most of the violations are politically 
motivated. 
9 Labour Relations Amendment Act (Chapter 28:01) . 2000. 
I°University of Zimbabwe Act (Chapter 26:01). 1990. 
IIPrivate Voluntary Organisations Act. 1995. 
12Access to Information and Protect of Privacy Act. 2002. 











They involve ahdlldi"n ~, arr~'t~ and delenli()n~, assaults, alt~mpl~J mllTtkr<;, death 
threal<;_ disappearance<; and displacements_ Th~ tahle he lmv (Fig 10) indlCmes 
reported incidents or hllman rights violations ov~r th~ years and shows ~ m~ssive 
increase in atTests wilhout detention. ""200G accollnls for 27~-1i of all violations thm 
have been reported to date illld 2005 and l006 together are nearly half of ~Il 
reported violations sin~~ 2001 (71 1 RF. lO1l6. p.l( F. 
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The reported \·iolmions shown (Fig 10) are supported by Freedom JIouse country 
as~e<;sments of civil <lJlU political lihenies Ii-om 21J03 to 2006 to date in 7imb~bwe 




















Sinee 200] Ih~re h.a~ he~1l a grwlual d~dill~ in ~ivil liherli~s ill i'imbahwc (Fig II J. 
The evidence i~ consi~I~1l1 wilh tl)te r~port~d ill~iden[s of violalions during lhc samc 
period ,,·hich I ~d 10 Ihe closure of Ihe oilly independenl daily new~paper. The Daily 
News. It w~s hmnhed in 2002 alld ~uh~e'-luenlly shut down b)' the M~dia Infomlati(~l 
councIl (MIC). CU1T~nt1y, ~Illhe foreign media ag~llcies soch as the BBC and CNN 
ar~ hanned Ii-om I.imhah,,~ as they are accus~d of peddling propaganda to effect 
regin)te change in I.imhab,,~. 
The m~dia has rn,en thre~lened wilh all fomb of pumshment. ranging Ii-om aJT~st, 
de[l()rtation and hanishmenl lo dcat h. Thcse \'iolations hm~ hem opcnly justiti~d h> 
the i'imhabwean go\'emm~IlL I'm example, the then IVlinista of Home Amnr~, who 
currently is the Spcaker of Parliament. John J\komo comm~nts that: 
E,en the press ~n: now reguJ~led hec.lu~e you know; you ha,'e ~ t~ndell~y of 
thc press, thc print media and so on of inciting people to violence. I hose who 
\\ant to condemn Zimbahwc for coming up with these pieces of legislation arc 
themselv~~ intne~ted in creating ,iolenee or a violent en\'ironment in 
I .imhahwe (as cited ill 7HRL 2007, 1'30) 
Ti)tere ha \'e ~ Iso heen relx)rt~d illcidellce~ of the go\'ernment usillg the slale appar~tus 
such as the police and the courts to det~ill civil societ)· le~ders ~nd opposition leaders 










ruling party have been given fa,ourabk treatment and Jmnesty for political crim~s. 
Equally, with the dedine in ci"illiherties there has he"en a drop in politicJI rights (fig 
121· 
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Gh~n tl1]'; hi slorv. how h~v~ or(iinan 7imbabwcans c\'aluatcd thc statc of their post-. . 
ind~P<'nd~nc~ d~mocr~(ic institutions? Attitude,> or Zimhabweans ~re cxamincd in 
(his reg~rd rcbting to their pcrson~1 Frecdoms. thc fairness of elcctions. the 
respon,>ivcn~ss or ekcted rep.-e,>enl~tive,> and thc ""pply o r dcmocTll~y. 
5.2.f Personal Fradoms 
'Il,C in~idcnts related to violations of frcedom reported al".l>"e are consistent with the 
atlitlldc,> or indi \'idu~1 Zimhabwe~n,> on thcir pcrson~l tT-cedoms (Fig I 3). To evaluatc 
trend,> lTI political fi'eedoms over the past rc" ycars rc<,pondenls were askcd "hcther 
they felt th~l tll<."re were any improvcments in locir trecdoms compared to previous 
ye~rs. gO% ofre,>pondcnts revcalcd that pcrsmml Ii-cedoms to join any organisation 
were morc curtailed than in previous years. The other expressed dissatisfaction 
related to restriction, on 'freedom 10 say what they think.' where 76% of respondents 
confirm~d that they h<l<l k"~r fr~edoms in this rega rd, \Vhile 60'% felt 111<'1<' was lack 










An index to meaSl1r~ all items rdmcd to person~l Ireedol1b "as creUl"d and found to 
be ,alid and rdiabl~"'. A bivariate correlation re\'e~ls Ih,lt pcrc~pli"ns of ch.mgcs in 
personal Ireedoms is statistically jnsignifi c~n t in relation 10 prok~t potential but 
neg~\i\dy r~bkJ ( P~arson's R=-.058j. This indicates that individuals "ho ["el (hm 
their perS<JI1~1 Ii-c~don" ha\'" be~n ~rodcd arc kss likely 10 protest 













Que."liOrl" Fieu;,e (eil me if rhe jOi/mviOiI'; !liiOJ!'._'- al'c lHJI'"e ur heller nuw Ihan (h~" ~"re a f~" ye"r" 
ago, or "re Ihq 'he mm".- u) Freedom 10 s")' "1M you think b) Freed()m 10 juin uny orK,miwlioll'~ 
FrccJom(r()m unj".'! urn" Jj i'reedom 10 mr" 
S.2.2 Elec/iolls FT<'e alld Fair 
fhc country has had .1 multi-p.n1y sys [~m with regLliar dections sinc~ independence. 
[)iff~r~nt political p~rties such ~s the Zimb'lbwe Ali"ican Pcople's Union (Zi\PU prj. 
Zimbabwe Unit,· Movcment (ZCMJ to the Movement for Ikm<><;rali, Chang~ (r>.l[)Cj 
ha"e conlesl~d d~ctions , posing varying ch'lllenges to [he ru ling Zimbabw~ ,\frican 
National Union (ZANt: prj. The ruling party's re'1"'tual viclor)' in SlJC<:eS~l V~ 
elections h'ls been credited 10 Ihe une"Cn playing field coupled Ivith the use of 
l< FOdor "naly,i, evrac,"d a ,ingle lIJU",a1 .ct fuetor ( Fi ge" ,·aloc - l.50l which nplai'" 62.S fX''':~nl 
uf tlK' wmmo" Yaria,,,', InMx ... liability ( C,O!,hach .\ Ipha- _851 .~ high (n- I I 121 Factoe anal)";' i, a 
,tati,ti"al tccilniq uc that .ilo", th. wnd"'lSmion of complex '<1< of i"kc_cclaLio",hil" b<o,ween ,,-'verdi 
or many yactable, in (crms of" ,impler "ndellying SnllCtU[C The general aim or iaC[(x dndly'" i, TO 
redu" tl", wnlplexit)' of mul,iple obserwd \-ari"bks in t<nns of" <impkc. unUc, -lyin g Jime",;o, .. 1 












violence that has characterised political contests in Zimbabwe. The fairness of the 
electoral contests has been a subject of dispute among political parties and within civil 
society, who argue that the political processes favour the incumbent party. Since 
2000, Zimbabwe has held highly contested elections. The government of Zimbabwe 
has shown disregard for open and fair democratic practices. In some instances, ruling 
party activists have openly asserted that: 
Zimbabwe was won through the loss of blood and not elections . Therefore if 
anyone wants to take it he should go to war with the ruling party. Even if other 
people accept results we will not. We are married to this country and Mugabe 
until we bury him. (As cited in ZHRF, 2007, p.20) 
An example of the bias in the electoral process is the management of registration and 
supervision of elections by the ruling party. Human Rights Watch (2006) reveals that 
the processes of registering voters, delimiting electoral districts and providing for 
inspection of voters rolls is conducted in a non-transparent and discriminatory way. 
Public opinion data on Zimbabwe (Fig 14) reveals lack of confidence in elections. 
Only 19% of respondents indicated that the 2006 elections were free and fair, 20% 
saw that the elections were free and fair with major problems and 40% indicated that 
they were not free and fair. The low levels of confidence in the elections could be a 
result of public statements, as discussed above, that erode citizens' confidence in the 
state institutions. The attitudes of individual Zimbabweans to elections are 
significantly but negatively correlated with protest (with a Pearson R of -274**). This 
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5.2.3 Responsiveness 
In tb~ ab>cnc~ of b~,ic frecdoms ~nd in thc pr~,~nc~ of an declOral system wbich is 
op-'n to abu>c by lhc ,talc, thc proees, of holding ekeled re,pre""nt~tiws 
accountabk to th~ jX'opk is rendercd indfectivc, 
The evidence from individual Zimb~b"ean, who "ere asked whether dected 
respresentatiws li,len to tbem (Fig 15) ,how tb~t only 22% kit thai Member.; of 
P~rli~menl consider tlJ.,ir view, comp~red to 28% indieming tb~l loc~l government 
councillor, always listcn 10 thcm, This i, low compared to 78% of lhe people who 
("It tbat thcy h~d hc-cn consulted >omctilll~s ~nd or had newr be~n consultcd by ~ 
Mcmber 01" Parliament. (,g% ofll-.c re~pomknl~ indicalcd lhat lhe} had sometimes 
and./or ncvcr bc~n consulted by a councillor. It i~ jXlssibic thaI wi th the limitations on 
liwdom, powcr po,sibly currently rcsidcs n0t in til<: ahility 0[ th~ pe0pk to vote out 
clcct~d individu~ls but in statc ~pparatus to convincc people to votc or support 











touch with the peopk ha' ~en fi'm(l\'ed. It is also possibk thm because of the harsh 
economic environment, represenlalhes hilve limited financial resources 10 vi,il 
their fi"pectiw constituencies. Pvuluations of responsiveness of Zimbabweans }'IPs 
and local cOLlnci II ors are signi Ii cimt.!) nllTeimed wi th protesl (Pearson R - -1 IOU) I', 


















II Uo M,',,:b<l~ 0/ P"rI',mo"t I;,ten 
'D wha, I"-'Dplc h,',~ '0 '"~ 
II: D" Locol gOVctW<"-'f1t (0,,,,,;11,,,, 
1;'lC'f1l0wh.lt p""ple ho'" 1<> "Y 
Ijuesli()n: lIow much of Ihe lime Jo vou Ihink Ihe joll"wing try their /x;sl to lislen to whal pe'1"e like 
you have to _\aye Mem/x;", ()jParli"menl, UedeJ loml ~(J\ el'l1ment ('mmcil/o",' a) N,".-er b) Onlv 
_wme"me" 0) Otten d) AI"",',,' e) Dm>', kJJ''''' 
Ha\'lng considered ull the other IiICIJJf> that create a democralic ,"xidy, respondents 
w~r~ a,k~d their ani tlIde, fl'garding the levels or democra9 in 7.im rob" e _ Only 19'% 
or respondent, indicated their _';:lti,lication "ith democr.lcy m Zimbabwe (Fig 16)_ 
~I% of rcsporuknts fd! that Lilllhahwe's democracy was not sa!i,laLlory while 
mhers indicated !hatlhej' did not regard it '" a demO<Tacy at all 
I j Th. i,.ms m.o,uring w h.th.r Membel'; of p.orliamo", and Coundll,.,., [i,kn to what p<."opk- sa) are 
<ufileicnll,- corrc lated rca",,,,' , T",\ ,755") ond T.I ioh!. C,o"hoch Alph.o-( ,851 to wormnl ([<<Ilion ofJ 
1wo ikm ,,'cmgc- c",,,'met orr.<pon,iwn.,-, (n- 111211 "1"xt tho Cronboch', Alpha which is 0" 











To J)ltaSur~ supply for u~lllocra~;' a \\\0 ikm cnnslrud was n~akd \\hi~h is 
sulliciently corr~bt~d and reliabk. 16 
F igu r~ 16. Salisli,dion with ,-kll1ncr"~y 7imbab\\c 200S 
------_. 
Satisfaction with Democracy 
JO "" 
Que,,'ion: Overal/, how "'''I>jieJ Ilre you wif/, rhe way deMiC,.",y "wb ill Zimb"lm ", ,1) Zi1>Jhahw, is 
Do" 'I noi a Jem(){'C~9' h) ,\01 a/ dl wl/.Vied clNai ,'cry mli.Vied dj F uirl) 'illisfied e) Vel)' sa(isjied}) 
5.2.4 Sllpp~r 'if Democracy 
Public opinion dm~ from Afrobaromder (2005) (Figl?) inJicakd thaI, \\(h~1l asked 
th<.'ir vic\\s on th~ extent of democracy in ZimbJbwc, 51% of I'~SrOl1dent, ass~n~d 
that the country was not democratic. 44% felt that it '\ias a Jtmocr<lcy ,'ith probkms 
and oni)' 5~/. indicated lha1 it was a full d~mocracy with problems. 10 luca'mre 
supply for democracy a 1\\0 item index "TIS created combining satisfaction with 
d~mocracy and views of the extem of democracy. A bivarint~ corelation of supply for 
J~mocracy and prot~st is ll~g~ti\"dy significant (I'tnrson R - _203H). this m~ans 
r<:spond~ms who Jrt dissmisfi~tl with dtm ocracy "'" kss I ihl Y 10 proles!. 
'" lhe ilem, mea,urinp; e.,[em of democrac~ and ,,,, i,fact ion a,·, ",fflciently cOllelmed Pea'son·' 
r"i.~77") and re tiab le Cmnbach Atpha-( . n) to warrant c"mion of a two irem a,",""age COmlTlIct of 











Figure 17: l' erceptions of le\,{']s of democracy Zimbab" c 24105 
Extent of Democracy 
Quejfion In )'"'' opinion, 110,.. mllcn of,' democr,,,y i, Zimbabwe ,,,day' AjNOI a d"mocr,,,:, b) A 
delnocn><)" ,..ilh maiN pro/>/eln., ciA del~ocn"y />ul ",ilh minor pmN,'m.1 Ji A full Jd"""rmy ~jDo nol 
lInder.Iland qllesljordo mJi ullders/,,,,d ,,·hM "d~m'x'n"">'" u /! DOli '( """'" 
5.3 \luhivariate Regression l\lodcl uf Pnlitkallb ,pianaliuns and 
Protest 
7.imhahwean', e\'alualions 01" tilt: political 8y'tem and lheir a,wdalion \\ith prot~8t 
tx;,hav iour ha\'~ tx;,~n discu'8ed, Tilt: o\'erall and rebli\'~ impact of thes~ fa~lOrs Oil 
prot~,t in 7imbabwe will nOw be eon'idercd. Whil~ man)' 01" Ih~ s~ lactors ha\'~ a 
slrong impact taken log~lh~r, all l;lct,)!,S ~xplain only 6% ol"th~ variance in r~'poIl8e8 
10 prole,1 polentiaL 
Ex,mlilling the stimwrdi8ed regression <:oefJid~nt, we can s~e that thc most impo!1Jnt 
political cvaluation rdakd (0 prote81 pot~ntial is the ~on,ideralion lhal l.imhahwe"s 
deetions are nOI free and fair. Th~ second strallgc;:! factor rdales to (he vic", that 
political freedoms hav~ bc~n eroocd over the )1a<,t few ycar;L Thi , i, interesting, since 











However ~onlrolling for (he simullancous impacI of other allilmies. Ihe impacl or 
perceivcd decline in righl~ becames evidcnt , 
" , 
Supply 0 f (iem'lCTill:) 
PcrsoJk11 Freedoms 
R"spoo~i \'coess 
Ele<:lions Frec iltK1 Fair 
Eleclions Ensur~ Parliamenl rdktls 
Adjmted R Square - (_ ()WI (,, - 11111 
rhe factors tbm ha\'~ stllll\g ~xplan;l lor:~i power in lhe model al'~ pessinllstic " iews or 
I h~ li-e~nc~s ilTld rairness or elections and b~lkE; iTi lhe ~ro~iOTi or pcrsoJk11 frccdo ms 
which arc negatively related (Ikt:r -,1:(0) aTid J194)_ II was hypothesised earlier lh:11 
iodi, idnals who feel thnllbeir dect~d reprc~cotilli\es arc responsi\'~ ar~ more likely 
10 protest. Conv~rsely, lhose who ICcithal Zimbabwean elc~tion~ ilr~ 001 Iree and rair 
me more likel )' to participate in protes l ~ or demooSlmlion s_ rhe rcsul1s arc not 
cOTisislelll \\ith my hypothesis :IS lhcy rc,eal I1mt views on lepr~senlnt"es 
resp:msiveness me insignilicill\l in molivating pro1cs1. Ikliefs in II"" unfairnes~ of 
elections me less likely 10 increase protest potential. 
HO\\'c\er. it is important 10 reikrat~ the IlTidiTi g Ihm pol itical factors accounl for only 
6'l'0 of explamlions of prolesl p:lllicipation. Therefore chapter 6 explores :Il\olher 
iTillucTice _ the impact 01' co lleclive action dilemma - 00 protesl participation. To what 












COLLECTIVE ACTION DILEMMA 
While the state elites are risk taking the masses in Zimbabwe are 
predominantly risk averse demos ... they were made risk averse through a 
process of conditioning over time making them politically passive and inert... 
For that reason Zimbabweans are the easiest people to govern in politics and 
indeed in any social arena than any other group of citizens in the region and 
beyond ... as such the road to mass action is blocked because of few takers 
(Masunungure, 2006, p.2-3). 
The previous chapters discussed the economic and political determinants of protest 
participation. None have yet provided wholly satisfactory explanations. Perhaps we 
need to consider how the collective action dilemma affects both the politically 
repressed and economically dissatisfied, providing disincentives to protest. The 
Afrobarometer survey provides no measure of citizens' perception of the collective 
action dilemma. But it does provide valuable measures of factors often seen as useful 
to overcome this dilemma, such as membership of civic organisations and degrees of 
trust in opposition parties. The Afrobarometer survey also provides a measure of 
political fear, which exacerbates the collective action dilemma. These concepts will be 
correlated with participation in protests and demonstrations to establish whether they 
have an effect in determining predispositions to protest. I anticipate that Zimbabweans 
who do not belong to a group that advances their interest and who fear the state will 
not be willing to protest compared to those who belong to associations and groups and 
do not fear the state. 
6.1 Measuring the collective action Dilemma 
6.1.1 Fear 
Fear is often identified as a factor that limits participation in protests. Fear increases 
the perceived risk involved in participation. If perceived risk outweigh the benefits 
people are bound to make rational decisions not to protest (Olson 1965). Thus 
Zimbabweans may have been demotivated by the massive repression in Zimbabwe 











The Afrobarometer country report (2001) probed the mood III Zimbabwe and 
concluded that; 
There is no doubt that political fear is rampant in Zimbabwe. More than four 
out of five of the country's citizens (83 %) say that, often or always, "people 
must be careful of what they say about politics". There is no difference 
between urban and rural areas, which tends to confirm that political 
intimidation, whether by war veterans, green bombers, or the police, is 
widespread (Chikwanha-Dzenga, et aI, 2001, p.23). 
Makumbe (1994, p.1) confirms the overwhelming climate of fear in the country and 
argues that "people dare not discuss the views of an opposition party in public for who 
knows, the women's' league or the ZANU youth may hear you, the public is all the 
time looking over its shoulders when it comes to discussing political views that are 
contrary to those of the ruling party." In 2006, citizens were asked whether they are 
careful of what they say at times. The evidence as shown in the table below (Fig 18) 
reveals that there has been a gradual increase in fear between 1999 to and 2005. 38% 
of the respondents confirmed that they are always fearful in 1999, while 65% felt this 
in 2005. Despite fear being so widespread, there is a weak bivariate association 
between political fear and protest potential (Pearson= -.065*). Fear reduces the 
potential to protest, as it is negatively related to protest participation. 
In an alternative measure of fear, respondents were asked whether they had been 
forced to vote in the previous elections. Fully one fifth confirmed that they had been 
forced to do so (Fig 19). Indeed, those who experienced this form of political 
repression in the elections are less likely to have protested and indicated they would 
not do so in the future Fear, measured by the views of individuals who have had a 
family member or personally been forced to vote is negatively related to protest 
participation and significant (Pearson's r = -.216**). Similarly, individuals who were 
careful of what they said because of fear instilled by intimidation during elections had 











figure 18: r.r«plions of f •• r in Zimhah"e 2005 
Fear 1999-2005 Zimbabwe 
1990 
Qucslinn: In Ihis ,'nunl,y, lrow ufien: Do p~uple hm'e r" be can1ul4,,'hat they s") ah()wl'oliliu '~) 
111<''')'' h) Often 'J R<Y'ei)' d} "h~' ,," ei Don ' I kn"", 






















(luesliun- I'lease Iell me i(.I'-'" agre~ IX disagree ",ilh Mc'h nne of thcf;,i{ml'i"~ staNm,nJs: /)llrmK Ihe 
c"'''p,'ign jur Ihe ]()t)5 March l,<,,/iamenfm)' c/~c";on "''"C ynll or aIry' 'mmediate memher '1 your 










6.1.2 A .' .wcialion<ll Life 
Almond and Verba (1 "163) argue that voluntary organisations incr~ase the prop~nsil y 
of individuals participate in poli ti~al ftClion because they provide opportunities I{)r 
training in participation. RmUon (19X9) argucs that while- associational lire in Afri~a 
has takcn various forms. it Jms e\·erywhc,-e pnl\"ided ordinary ci tizens with an outlet 
for the political urge to join olhl'-, in the pursui t of shared goals. In a ~005 
Afrobarometcr sUldy rcspondents were asked "hether the)' belong to any of the 
following groups: religious groups . trdde unions, farmcrs' unions, professional or 
business associations or community deve lopment a",sodations. 'Ihcir responses arc 
illustrated below (fig 20). The e\' iJ~nLe show, adi ve mcmbership of religious 
groups - from 60% in 1999 increasing 10 63% in 2005.Thcre is a dra.~tic dccl ine in 
adi\'c mcmbership of trade unions and brrners as.~(",ia1 i on from 21% in 1999 to 
2% in 2005. Similarly, there is a huge declille in ""l;\~ membership of and otlicial 
leadership positions in professional and bu,ine,s organisat;(lll - from 31 % in 1999 to 
3% in 2005. 
Figurt 20: As>od.!ion. l lifo in Zim b. h" t 200~ 
----- --_.-
Associationallife in Zimbabwe 1999-Z005 
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The reason for the decline in active membership in organisations such as trade unions 
is possibly because of the political crisis that has affected the economy. Whereas the 
rise in membership of religious organisations might be in response to the crisis, where 
more and more people disillusioned by initiatives to solve the deepening crisis in 
Zimbabwe are turning to religion for consolation. Bratton (1989) explains that 
associational life does not thrive amid political disorder, lawlessness and inadequate 
physical infrastructure and intermittent essential services. This might possibly explain 
the decline in associational life in Zimbabwe. The bivariate correlations indicate that 
belonging to a professional or business association is strongly associated with protest 
behaviour (Pearson's r = .207**). That is, belonging to a professional organisation 
increases protest potential. However, membership of a religious group (with a 
Pearson R of -.049), trade union or farmers association (.036) or belonging to a 
community development self help association (.045) is not statistically significantly 
related to protest participation. In Chapter 4, dealing with economic explanations and 
protest, the evidence reveals that protest is a weapon for the economically secure. 
When combined with this finding it suggests that political opposition to Mugabe is 
undertaken by the middle classes and not the working class population. 
6.1.3 Identification with the opposition 
The other factor that may help to overcome the collective action dilemma is raised 
levels of trust in opposition political parties. The Afrobarometer survey offers two 
separate measures of citizen trust and identification with the opposition. The evidence 
below (Fig 21) reveals that in 1999, 5% of respondents identified with the opposition 
and 29% with the ruling party. But by 2005 identification with the ruling party has 
decreased to 20% and with the opposition has increased to 33%. A bivariate 
correlation of identification with the opposition and protest potential confirms that 
there is a significant and strong relationship (Pearson R =.258**). This means that 











r~UI'< 21: R"'po.d<"" "ho ideo lir~ "ilh the o~[>U'itio" 2005 
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Q"~stimJ: Which party do )'nu feel clm~ tn" 




Par(i~ipa(ion m ri~ky ~oll~di\'e aclion like pollli~al prok~(~ may depend on lh~ belief 
(hat (ho;;e ,,\><) hll\'~ in ilialed mod organi~ed the prok~t will com~ to on~'s r~'lCue if 
on~ l ~ arresl~d or injured. Yd mllny hll \'~ complained Ihat7imbahwe'~ opposition and 
~i\ie lead~rs ar~ olkn not pre~~nl at "",h rail ie, ~~p"elall; .. if (her~ is a risk of 
\'lOlen~~. To a,~s, the confidence I ~\'ds of p"0pl~ with regard to lhe oppo~ition, 
"'~pondent' Were a.~hd \><,w much lhey tnL~1 the oppo~i(ion. In 21104 3--1% r~sJX'nded 
lhat they didn "ttrust the oppo~ition at all, and 32% tru~ted (he opposition a link In 
2005 only 20% did notlTllst thc 0pp<"ilion:ll all compared with 31 % \\'00 tru,ted the 
opposition ~ little - ~ slight decline from Z004. Only 5% ofrespondents indicatc(] tky 
trush,d the opposition a lot in 2004 comp~n;d to 15% in ZOOS , \Vhile sti ll '<Of)' low, 
tru~l m th~ oppo,ilion has in ~rea~~d A bivariate ~orr~l<ltion of tru~l in (he oppo~ition 
and pr"(~~t polenlilll rC\ealed lhat the two are poSili\'dy mm:l:lted ( P~<lTson R 










Figure 22: l{e'l"lndeub; "'00 Iru,1 !he "PI""i!;on partie. limb. bwr 2005 




NOIil!JII A lot 
Question. 110" much Jo w'" Irusl Ihe /i!lIowinl<. or nun'n'l WiU hearJ el!oul<h upoul Ih<!m I" ,«" . Ihe 
Oppo.,ilion poiili",,1 purli~" .. I Nol .. , ull h) .iUSI u lillie ci Some", hUi J) A 101 d Von', 'now 
6.2 \lultivaria te ~egression \lodel of Collective Action and I'mtest 
Having revi~wed survey respons~s relal~d 10 rear. nusl in lhe opposilion. <lnd gwup 
memh~rship. th~ study now ~xamincs their coll~ctive inlluence on pwl~st 
partkipation, The model e'(plains 13% or the v<l6an~e in prolest potential. A fa<:lOr 
lhul has high expl=lorj' p"\\~ r In the model on o'~r~oming the wlkctiv~ a~tion 
<1il~mma is lhilt 01' he10nging 10 a proks.~JOnill or husiness ,L~so<:iation (Bew ,190). 
Belonging 10 <I religious glllup is also signili~<Inl hut neg<lli\,e1)' relat~d to prol~sl 
pilrllcipiltJOn. 11'\<11 is illllcr~<ls~S th~ coll ect ive adion dilemma. F~ar <lnd belonging 10 
a professional and business association arc statisticall)' signilicant in relation to 










,~Jil,-"ed /I Square 1_131) N 11 075) 
In condllsion, the eviocnce in toc modd is consistent with m: hypothe,i~ that 1Car 
deter~ one jrom participating in protest. Ilowe\"~ r. th~ inlcre~ting re~ult i,> that 
belonging to an opposi tion party and business association ellCour~ges pJ.rticip'ltion m 
protest while being part of a re ligious group lowers protest potentiJ.1. Surprisingly 
l"' longing to a trade wlion is insignificant 10 the model. Fe~r, e:>.p!J.in~ d by l"' ing 
j"rced to vote in toc Z005 elections, exacerbates the colketi\"e action problem 
1\ lembership of an opposition party oclps overcome the collective ,Iction dilemmJ.. 
In the nexl Chapter the study examines toc role of culture as a possible detmnimnt 
of low prolest potential in Zimbabwe. Unocr cultural explanation, v,llue~ or ~genc:, 
reSI"lt'cl for toc mle of law and at1ituocs to holding leaders aceountJ.blc ,>h~ll he 












If African people were not underdeveloped, passive, resigned and cowardly 
why would they accept underdeveloped leaders? We forget that every people 
deserves the leaders it gets (Etounga -Manguelle, 2000, p.70) 
Is protesting and demonstrating un-African? Is it alien to Zimbabwean culture? 
Scholars have argued that Africans have different ways of engaging with the state, 
ways that are informed by deeply held, socialised values and norms of communalism 
and patriarchal respect for authority (Ake, 1994). Contrary to conventional opinion, 
the ethos of the liberation struggle in places like Zimbabwe did not raise protest 
potential as it was commandist in nature. Is it justified to propose that there are 
practises within the African way of life that have a bearing on methods of engaging 
with the state in Africa? Is it correct to argue that in the African culture there is no 
demand for agency and accountability as the systems are based on trust that the 
leaders have the people's interest at heart? The African culture has been referred to as 
patriarchal. Under patriarchal values, leaders are seen as "fathers" and it is a sign of 
disrespect to march in the streets to express grievances as there are methods within 
African culture of channelling grievances' without parading them in public. Protesting 
is viewed as an embarrassment and disrespectful. These values have generated 
conclusions among scholars that Africa has an underdeveloped civic culture that 
breeds passivity, docility and loyalty. 
In the prevIOUS chapters, the impact of economic and political explanations in 
motivating participation through demonstration or protest is discussed. This chapter 
considers the impact of cultural values and their impact on determining the decision of 
individual Zimbabweans to participate in protests or demonstrations. The discussion 
will assess concepts such as agency, respect for the rule of law, and demands for 
accountability. Through these explanations I would expect that individuals who are 
respectful of their leadership and do not demand accountability from their leadership 
are less likely to participate in protests or demonstrations. Furthermore, it is 
hypothesised that respondents who obey their leaders and support the rule of law are 











7.1 What is political Culture? 
African societies are often said to be characterised by a subject political culture that 
emphasises respect for tradition. Kamrava (1995) supports this view. He states that: 
Political nuances such as patriarchy or coercion give regime orientations a 
fa<;ade of unanimity, normalcy and stability, and prompt people to resort to a 
different type of behaviour towards the state to engage in a different form of 
politics if they are given the opportunity to do so (Kamrava, 1995). 
What is not clear is whether protest could possibly form part of the behaviour that 
people can resort to or not Thompson (2000, p.12) explains that "adversarial 
political culture was alien to the continent and nationalists considered it foolish to 
recreate institutions that had been born and evolved out of Europe's need to manage 
social inequality and class conflict" By celebrating such virtues, African leaders were 
able to motivate for a one party state. 
What then are the African methods of engaging with the political leadership? 
Thompson (2000) and Ake (2000) explain that African forms of participation were 
romanticised by leaders such as Sekou Toure, Jomo Kenyatta, and Julius Nyerere who 
described how their forbearers had traditionally met as communities rather than as 
individual contestants. To make decisions, elders would sit under a village tree and 
discuss an idea until consensus was reached and then insist on conformity. Ake (2000) 
criticised African methods of participation as having inherent weaknesses that are not 
democratic, for example the exclusion of women in the decision making process. 
Moyo (1993) contends that the principle of the African system of participation was 
misunderstood when he argues that: 
African traditional values demand a system of governance which has one chief 
and one clan bound together by consensus politics ... However what is rarely 
articulated is that the revered Nyerere once argued that despite all the 
variations and some exceptions where the institutions of domestic slavery 
existed, African family life was everywhere based on certain practises and 
attitudes which together mean basic equality, freedom and unity (Moyo, 1993, 
p.1l). 
Unfortunately, these values were not embraced by most African leaders. The 
communal mode of participation was embraced by ZANU PF to restrict political 











The ruling party initiated a process to institute a de jure one party state. In May 1990, 
President Mugabe argued: 
When you hear us talk about one party state ... we are thinking purely that our 
family must be one. A one party state system would give Zimbabwe greater 
space and greater democracy (cited in Mandaza and Sachikonye 1991, pA 7) 
Etounga-Manguella (2000) explains that in the African custom it is rather 
inconceivable that an individual can be viewed as autonomous, an African can only 
bloom and develop through social and family life." Ake (1994, p.6) explains further 
that "participation is linked to communality as Africans do not generally see 
themselves as self regarding atomised beings in essentially competitive and 
potentially conflicting interaction with others, rather their consciousness is directed 
towards belonging to an organic whole. 
Hyden (2006), attempts to explain the values that shape participation among Africans 
through his theory of the "economy of affection17". His theory differs from relations 
of power in other types of political economy, where social relations are disembodied 
from the origin in local places. It offers pragmatism adaptability to cope with shifting 
conditions over which people have little control. Hyden (2006, p.83) further argues 
that "people do not strive for the right to speak out and challenge authority, as is the 
case of the ideal type of civic communicative space. He gives an example of the 
widespread disillusionment with governments in African countries, which has 
produced an interest in professional and other circles creating a civic culture. The 
fledging culture of the civil society is still under economy of affection, since power 
remains personal rather that institutional. If the economy of affection has extended to 
civil society, it does not explain the influence of culture in driving these institutions. 
To measure culture an assessment of one's regional location and gender can assist in 
looking at its impact on protest. As in most African societies rural people are 
considered to be the custodians of African culture. Most traditional practises are 
preserved and observed in the rural areas. Similarly in Zimbabwe even traditional 
17 It is constituted by personal investment in reciprocal relations with other individuals as a means of 
achieving goals that are seen as otherwise impossible to attain, that is, sought after goals, whether 
material or symbolic, such as prestige or status have a scarcity value. That is, they may be physically 












structures of leadership are still part of the society. Whereas urban areas are 
cosmopolitan in nature and usually constitutes of people from different tribes leading 
to the erosion of culture. Rural people in Zimbabwe can be argued to be hostage to 
African culture. Moreso that culture advances patriarchal practises that define the role 
of women and men in society. Afrobarometer measures one's residential location and 
gender. And these items will also be used as proxies for culture. 
7.1.1 Residential location and Gender 
Political participation can be influenced by one's regional location. The assumption is 
that individuals who stay in the rural areas are homogenous and most likely to support 
the ruling party whereas the opposition is urban based. Previous local government, 
legislative and presidential elections have revealed that the ruling party has a strong 
hold in the rural areas compared to the urban areas. The Afrobarometer survey 
reveals that 64% of the respondents are rural based, compared to 36% who stay in 
urban areas (Fig 24). A bivariate correlation between one's residential location with 
protest reveals a negative but significant relationship with protest potential (Pearson 
R= .189**). This means that urban people are more likely to protest compared to 
people living in rural areas. As for gender, the evidence from Zimbabwe revealed 
that in 200S SO% of the respondents were male and SO% female. A bivariate 
correlation of protest and gender is negatively related (Pearson r= -lS0* *). That is, 
females have less protest potential compared to males. This might be because of the 
risk involved where participating in protest in the current repressive environment in 
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7.1.2 ACnJIIJI/"bilify 
To what extent do Limbabwcans fed it is their duty to hold elected repre~elltativcs 
accountable? In other words. do Zimbabweans sec themselves as active agents'! 
Africans have been classified as too loyal to their leadership and cntmsting them with 











Fi~ure H: Perception; of I<,,<l<,.,. < Ie, 01> of a,co~ntabilit~, l.i mbab"e 2(~)~ 
~-. , 
• Who><""'r"'''~""''' j", ",,' i 
'~",,,,I>c,,,, "",1;"""", 00 to«, i 
A(wunta llil ity 
" 
II ;;::;;, j ."""""'"' 
/[,",""VO _ llO'''CO,"''~ 
I ~ • 
Q,,~s/i(!I1: Who ,I"mld b~ r~,pu""ibl" ju,- mal<ing sure ,hat, once d"cled. Mem"""" (1'1'arliam<'l1/ do 
their .!o!Js" a/ The PI'<,_,id",,!'becUlin' bj Ihe Pal'liament 'J Tileir p,,/iticai pm·t}' J) Th e rOl'",< e) 
Don ', 
In the sur\'cy rc~pondents were asked their opinion regardjn~ who should be 
responsible to cn~ure that /l,lembers of ParliamelJ1 and IcK'al g:ov~mm<,nt coun~1iIors 
do the ir job In contrast to poPlilar wisdom. lheir r~sponse~ (Fi~ 24) sho" evidence 
lhat mdi~ate~ a con~iderable number of respond~nls have a hjgh~r demand I'or 
a~C\luntahjlily , " ,jlh 54'~';' expressing the view thaI vOt~fS are f~sp(msible lilr 
enSUring: /l,l~mb"r~ of Parliamcnt do their job, Smilarly 56% of lh~ f<'spondenls 
ad.o\\ Icd~ed Ihal 1 I i~ thc voters-role to hold cOllnci Ilors accoUJltabl~ for lhelr work_ 
Despitc Ihc hi~h levels of ackno\"ledgment of r~sponsibll ity for holding: mcmbcr~ 01 
parliamenl accounlable. a significant number of individuals identili~d the exemli\'e 
as reponsibl ~ - 32 % leI! /l,1cmhcr~ of Parliament were responsible and 24% kIt 
Cl)uncillofs should have Ihis re~ponsihlity. 6'~;, of the respondents indicated that it is 
Ihe n,ling party's rcsponsihility. Th~ evidenc~ abov~ sligg:e~l~ lhm 21mbabweans 
take a fairly large responsibility for lheir fal~ Flullo "hm extent do thcse belief~ 
atf~l1 protest p:JlticipJtion? Fll\'anate mrreIalio" reveals Ih31lnOSe Zimbahwe3ns who 











perceplions of holding cledcd bureaucrals accoumablc arc slatislically 
in,igni lic,llll (Pearson R --.(n I ). 
7. J.3 R uJI! of Law 
To establish [Ile predjspo~jljon of 7.irnllabwean~ (owards Ihe mle of law respon~es 10 
queslions were combined, Tlle'<e rebled (0 \\'Ile\her peopk should obe" go\'emmen[. 
find lawful solutions to probkms. and forego use of ,iolence in Zimbabwe;m politics. 
From t,""se a multiple item index "'"IS creakd which is a rdiable me'-lsure of resped 
for the rule of laW.l~, Below is '-I rev iew of (h~ items lll'-l! conslitute [he index. 
discussed sepawtel)' Different ~uHul'es h'-lw different method, and systems [0 de'-ll 
with bw1cssness, Some res.ort to community justice led by ,igil;mtes and olher forms 
of pWlishment. such us b;mishment from the community or corporal punishment. as 
in Uols"ana. In order to assess the predisposlions of Zimlmhweans "itll regard to the 
nile of law individuals were asked whether they agreed willl the use of unlawf ul! 
means to solve problems, 
Fi~" 1'0 24: A niludo, "r r.,!,<cling rule 011." Zimbabwe in 2(1{15 
--- ---- ---------, 




[)o vou "~"'" wIt h i~no'-"l~ Ill" Do you '~rc~' w,lh u$ing iowfull 
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pr"" le m, 
Q,,~s'irm: Wilich of ,IJelol/rywing ."~temetl" is d osesl 10 yow vi.-w? Choose Slal"men! A or .'),,,,,menl 
fi: A It i , belter IOjinJ ia>o-jiJi JolUlionJ 10 p roblemJ ",'en !lillak"J long!" 
" I'll" factoc "naly'" ""ra""d" singlo unml"ltd factoc "'Ih an F j~en ""1,,,,- (L14 )whi<h expl"ins 











The evidence (Fig 25) shows that 66% of respondents supported usmg lawful 
solutions to solve problems, compared to only 33% who would justify ignoring the 
law. This possibly means that despite the abuse of human rights within Zimbabwe 
people still have confidence in the law, regardless of the reported violations 
committed over the last 7 years. More importantly, one would expect that with the 
level of lawlessness in the country led by a few people aligned to the ruling party this 
could likely permeate society. Yet this is not the case. Do attitudes on the rule of 
law affect participation in protest action? Bivariate correlation reveals that an index of 
perceptions of individuals' respect for the rule of law is negatively correlated and 
statistically significant (Pearson's r= -.247**) . This means less support for the rule 
of law reduces protest potential. 
7.1.4 Obedience to government 
A second element related to attitudes to the rule of law involves obedience to the 
legitimacy of authority. The study attempted to establish whether respondents would 
feel obliged to obey a government even if they did not vote for it. The evidence from 
the Afrobarometer surveys (Fig 26) reveals that 83% of respondents concurred that 
they ought to obey authority, compared to 15% who indicated that they would not 
























Atre" wflh 8 m,l n''<-''~'."y 10 
0;)(', ~ov"m",cl\ll d,d not "()l~ 
'" 
A~rec w'lh Neither A~r'" w,th A \0 o!><"/ 
gOVC'''''11t'nt e,en If I ,I,J Ml 
vol" 1« ,I 
Qut'SlfOfjS: Whf('h oj rhe jvll()~1nl£ s/a/em""I' j, c/o>e,"1 IU y()UI' "jew:' Ch",,, •• , .'talem.'Hi "lor ,,,'Iart'ment , 
7.1.5 J",'ijimt;on for l'ioll!,,,'e 
The otkr m~a,ure rn ~nt of the rule of law is i lc~tification fo r IC\C of violcT1<;c. Th~ last 
se\'tn years in Limbabw~ have seen an up~urg~ in ca~es or p<)litiCillly moliqtC(l 
\'ioknct. A cultur~ of state vioknce to a~hicv~ pol itical oul~omes is Ihe current 
norm in Limhabwe Vio lenCe has not only ocen monop<) lised hy lh~ ruling party but 
ev~n the opposition has hecn ac"uscu of us ing vlOlcT1<;~ Ii", p<) litical ~ml s. , lias this 
culturc of vio l~ncc pCfl11eatcu the I.imhahwean poh!y? The evidence bdow (fig 27) 
rcvtals that 7--1 ~';' of citizen, bdicvc thai ,iolenee i~ nOl justifi ed in limbabw~an 











Figurr 26: J'rr<·rpliok' on p<>lilka l yi<>lonco in Zimb. bwo 2005 
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7.1.6 Ag<'Jlcy 
Hyden (2006) argues lhat A Ii-iean ,,-,ci eti es have developed an 'ccoll0my of ~fl"ectioll· . 
"here infonllal chan""b I.;!ke precedence over leg~l ch~nneh. The Alroh~lW\1der 
~lLncy ask~d people "hat lhey would <k> "h~n conli"(mled "ith dilTerenl problems. 
The respondcnt'. \VCIT asked "hether the.y wOlild resoh'e pT(lblem~ by jusl lea\'mg 
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Questio,,: What if anyrhing, wowld you do to II)' and re,oI.-e ea,II of rhe fi,llol>;ng _'iluali",.,,? AI Don 'I 
wV"'}' things Will be r ... oIwd gill€!! ""ou~h tim .. b)L"d~ .. complmm II]foligil proper c/lGnne/s or 
procedure, <) U,e ",nneaio,,-' wilh injluemial p~"ple dJ O(fcr lip or bribe "J Join in public' jXolCSI ji 
Nothing, b~c'auje nolhml: wn be don~ g) Oth~r hJ JJon ' I kno\!' 
~lo,;t re,;ponuenL~ indl<;"I~ u th~t th~y would loug~ "wmpJaint if they hud problems 
with Ih" jil1l0v.ing: ohl~i ning "perulit. gelting their name on the , -oters' roll. if they 
~ ll~J""cl ~ '" hO(l1 ~iJ ni ~ (l ni d "I 0 I' ste~1 ing, i I' they were unj ustly arrested or i r someone 
"T(mgly seized hunily land l 9 for example, with rderence to land se izure" \\hich 
a ffec t m~ny people, 85% (l r the r~ ,;p(llldents ~ffil1ncd Iheir preference t'or using legal 
chmmcls. In contra';t to \\h"l Hyuen ,;~e~ ~~ the prdi:n-ed m~"ns ortrans~eti(ln in the 
economy of atTcc1ion, only 4% of thc rcspondcn!,; indical~u 1hat 1hey olTer hri he~ ~nu 
7% would use their connections to influence issues {HvdclI 2006}. 
J" R",p'-)["lc fll , "hu woutu k)uge a comp la 'nt waiting tilc penTIit 55'/" mi"in~ (>Il ,'(lte" rol. 530/., 
""p<d "I'fi, ial of'lealing R5%." rongfully alT"""" 76',.. "T(>Ilgi) ><j"" land 35% 
65 


















The lack of inclination 10 usc protesl action could possibly imply II,at indi, idual 
Zimbubweans are ~ti II confident of toc cfiicacy of using lawful channels 10 so lye theiT 
problem~. Bi,ariate corrl'ia tion reYeals agency is insignificant and neg<lti"ely ",Iated 
1(1 pn1lest (Pcarson R - ·,072). This means that individuals who \\(oliid reS(1rt 10 
mioml<ll channels for resohing prohlems are less likdy to prot~Sl. 
7.2 Multhariatl' Regn'ssion Modd ofCllitllr(' and Prot('st 
Participation 
Taken together lhes.c cultuTal fadors cxplain 6% of th~ yuriance in pTot~st 
particip<ltion. The t\\O t;;dors that havc high e>.planatory pow~r on the mGdcI. 
ulthough neg<ltiYely reluted arC Tcsidenli<li location and respect for the ruk of law 
(wilh a Deta of ·122 UJl<1 ·]93 respecli\'cly). 
Adj"\ted R '''I''U'~ (.II66) (11-1/11) 
Chapt~J' 8 examiocs the imp<lct of cognitive <lwa",ness on pH1tesl paTlicipati(11L Do 













As people become ever more aware of the world around them they gain the 
ability to form opinions around them on the political and economic issues of 
the day ... and comprehend the manifold ways in which their lives are affected 
by decisions made by distant power holders. (Bratton, et aI, 2005, p.203) 
Chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7 dealt with political repression culture, economic dissatisfaction 
and associational life as possible determinants of protest participation. This section 
assesses the degree to which cognitive awareness, measured through one's level of 
formal education, media exposure and cognitive engagement, may determine 
participation in protest or demonstration. Expectations are that individual 
Zimbabweans who have limited access to news media, low levels of formal education 
and are uninterested in public affairs will be less likely to protest. 
8.1 Measuring Cognitive Awareness 
8.1.1 Education 
Formal education builds the individual cognitive skills that are necessary to enable 
citizens to participate effectively by "developing competencies, self concepts, 
knowledge, values and world views which enable them to understand the workings of 
the political system and learn to manipulate it to their advantage either individually or 
collectively" (Amove, 1973, p.198). Other than creating some understanding of the 
political situation, education increases knowledge and induces a continuing quest for 
knowledge through reading and accessing the mass media. Education may often 
create awareness of civil liberties and human rights, yet it may simultaneously lower 
the propensity to engage in violent protest. It also increases the level of opposition to 
any forms of repression from the government. (Hall, Rodegheir and Useem, 1986, 
p.565) argues that "educated people are more likely to tolerate or grant legitimacy to 
collective action on behalf of a cause they may not support." 
Whereas on the other hand Zimbabweans are said to be too educated to protest and 
look down upon such methods of engaging the state as only meant for the 











indi,idual ZimbalmcJns rcspondcnts \\crc askcd how mll~h cdu~alilln lh~y had 
auaincd. 
Figurr 28; Rr'JIOmkm, IrHIs of <"<loration. l-imb.bwt 2005 
NofOfl11dl/informill <;OI11C <;omcs.ew"dilr\· 




Po,t ,""",,">dar\' U nive-rSity NlIC"t,c,,\ 
qu.I,f'Cil!ICn 
Qu~slion' Whut Ih~ high~sl lA"ei uf educalioo YOII /i'JW complaed ? a) Na formal jchooling b)biform<d 
schooU"g only incllldmg Koranic schoolillg c)Sam~ prim",y "hooting u,Prim",y "chad complereu 
eiSome .IecunJIII,' school lhiSh .<"h()d compleTed .fiPml .IewnJQry <luali(icUli"",. alher Ih"" "ni'·er.l ily 
g)Same ~"i'·e,.,ily h)U"i'·'~·.\IIy c"mpleieJ i) 1'"" gr<lJ~ale 
The evidence above (fi:; 29) revea ls thm only 7% of the itlformants had either 
informal schooling or no formal schooling compared to 28% of the respondents who 
hU\e eithcr completed primary school or have somc primary school education. !fthc 
level of education is key to detennining the efficacy of one"s pUJ1icipmion in protest 
tbe evidcnee above shows that a high number of respondents have the basic levc! of 
education to enable thcm to gain thc necessary skills to efficiently partidpate in 
protest 
Ev~ns ~nd Rose (2(106. p.l) explain that e'en "primary schooling promotes citizen 
endor.<;cm~nt of dcn)(}(;ra~y ~nd rcj~ction of D0n-<kmllLTa(i~ ~hema(i,~~ ~v~n ", h~n it 











correct it therefore follows that even the 28% with primary school education can grasp 
at least some of the world around them and can participate in protest action. 
The evidence above also indicates that 54% of the respondents had secondary school 
education and 10% have University education. These results are consistent with 
anecdotal evidence where Zimbabwe is said to have high levels of education with 
highly skilled people. Zimbabweans are able to read and write and to conceptualise 
issues because of their relatively high levels of education. Bivariate correlations 
confirm that higher levels of formal education are indeed strongly related to higher 
levels of protest (Pearson's R =.227**). In the previous chapter the evidence revealed 
that protest is mostly associated with the economically secure, and with professionals, 
and in this section the evidence attributes protest to the educated. The evidence seems 
to suggest a pattern of protest in Zimbabwe undertaken by the middle classes. 
8.1.2 Media Access in Zimbabwe 
A second determinant of cognitive awareness is an individual's exposure to the news 
media. The mass media exposes ordinary people to various experiences beyond their 
immediate environment (Bratton, et aI, 2005). News programmes and other public 
affairs programmes play several roles in this regard, including making people aware 
of the issues confronting government at home and internationally. The news media 
expands the range of considerations that people bring to bear and informs their 
political and economic attitudes. Yet not all news media may be equally useful. 
A key distinction may lie with whether the media is state or privately owned. 
Currently the Zimbabwean government owns a significant share of the news outlets in 
the mass media sector with the Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) enjoying 
sole access to television and radio broadcasting. The only existing independent daily 
newspaper was banned. Thus whatever news Zimbabweans are exposed to within the 
country has bias towards the ruling party (Chuma, 2004). The three independent 
weekly newspapers are confined to urban areas with a small circulation and are not 
affordable to most Zimbabweans. 
The state of affairs in the media has limited people's exposure to what is happening in 











national identity by encouraging the youth to abide by the principles of the liberation 
struggle. 
ZBC was restructured via a purge of journalists who refused to toe the new 
official line and foreign programme content was reduced to 25%" After 2002 
control of the media was moved into the office of the President and this led to 
the introduction of the toughest laws. AIPP A was promulgated which requires 
the compulsory registration of journalists. Its enforcements have led to the 
prosecution of local journalist on flimsy grounds like 'causing an article to be 
published' ( Chikwanha-Dzenga, et aI, 2004, p. 4) 
Evidence from Afrobarometer surveys 1 and 2 suggests that popular use of the media 
has narrowed between 1999 and 2004. Daily consumption of radio news has dropped 
by a third from 60% in 1999 to 41 % in 2004. Daily newspaper readership is down by 
one half from 24% in 2000 to 12% in 2004. Yet access to the single official channel 
of television news, the content of which is closely controlled by government, has 
remained steady. As a result urban dwellers are now more than twice as likely to get 
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" Everyday " , ------, 
QlleSf!rffl, !lOll' uften do you gel fie"·, }'vm 'he /oIlow!,,!: .,<Juree.''- RadIO Ir"W'·. leh ... ·i., !on fie,.." 
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Ewry da).'/i Don 'r Kno" 
2006 survey results (rig 30) reveal that media exposure for individual /imhahwe"n~ 
i~ decreJsing from 2004. The evidence sbows that 42% of the respolldents cOllfmn 
lis\ening 10 r<idio news every day and 26'}~ are \\ithout access [0 llews Jt ~IL On 
td~\'iSllln 48% orlllt' respondents indkiltcd that they do not have acce~s to television 
news compared to 29% who are able to watch it on a day 10 da~ h~si ~ _ On access to 
newspapers !he e\,iueoce sho\\s that 51% ofth~ respondents do not h~\e aCCCSS 10 
newspapers compared to 8% who can read them on " daily h~sis_ ]'0 exrlain the 
cau.;;~s or this limited access, \1oor~ (l005. r .IIO) argues th~t /imh"hweans cannot 
afford baUeries illld r¥iios anj1nOre so li stening to the ~tate nc\\s has declincd hy ~ 
third ~l11ce \ 999. even the nllmber or people who read the rICwspapcrs h~s dropped h;-
half occilUse of the le,els of poverty", I'or those in lIfban areas having a telev ision is 
no differcnt to lhose \\h<l UO)(,t ,I-> Ih~re Jre lllllr)erolls daily blackouts because of the 
load shedding of elcdricity_ The f~w who Cim alTord generators hav~ s\,i tched on 10 
\.atellite news to avoid the stat~ rropaga1\d~_ MediJ e~pOSllre i ~ ;llso ~ig:nilicantly 
cOlTelmed with protest participation (Pearson's R .222**). This indicates that those 











8.1.3 Trust in g""emmellf media lind Independel/t new-,p"pl!r.\ 
Even though the newS media in Zimbabwe is state controlled, LimbabwcJns who 
h,I\,e exposure to new~ are more likely to protest. II is onl)' those who actually trust 
the go\'emment medi;l who arC less likely to do so, Pub lic opinion results eonflnn 
limi ted trust in 7 imh;lb"e 01 bo th ~tate owned ;lnd independent mcdia, The e\,iocncc 
(Fig 3 1) indicates that in 1999, 19'% ofth~ rcspondents indicatcd little or no trust in 
the ~l<!te media and this increased to 26"·{' in 2005, TTllst in the govcrnmcnt is also 
~tu1i~ti ~;lll y signili ~~nlly cOlTclaled with protest action (Pearson R = -.200*'). That is, 
tho,., who truo;t the gov ernment newspapers ;Ire less likcl)' to protest. 
ri ~ur< 30: R"t",nd<n t, .Uiludt" "r I ,",I in ~'" t'rnrnt'"! Ht'''''I'~I'<r' 21mS 
50 
----- -- ---- --
Trust in government broadcasting services 
1999-2005 
Nola!.11 >C<T"", hai '" 
Doo'(KnO'",/H."",," i 
I,""d .. 
_1999 " " " .. -----,-, '-,-_1004 .. " " " _ lOOS .. ;0 " " 
At the Same time people exrre~sed limited tru~t for the independent ne\"i~p~pers with 
'!'YO of the respondcnts expressing limited lncls of trust in thc media in 1999 











Figure _1 1: Responde.ls ~11 i!ud os III l ru, l i" ind ependent new'p"prr, l.im h ,h,..~ 2(~15 
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. 1999 , '" " " .; • . ,'" '" , ~ '" " .. ,. . .. __ .-.. ~OOS , " '" " ......... _ .. 
While trust in tl~ Slale media reduces prottst po!enti~l, tm,! in private media 
incre~sts it (Pcar,on r~. 1 .. 3) 
8.1A Cogllitj,·c Engag~m"" 1 
Cognitive engagement is the final factor used in this cmpter to me,ISl-lTe cognitivc 
~",Ireness_ h imolve, the level ofintcrcst in local or nRtion.u1 public affairs mKl active 
discussion of political events and policy issues with family_ friends ,ll1d neighlxlUrS. 
The current climate in I.imbabwe is highly polarised ~ondudve to people engaging 
in political Jiscussions, de'pirc tl~ risks in'-olved . Zimbabwe~ll" ,Ire consciollS o r-the 












To establi,h the level, of pnnlCip~lion of indi\Jdunl~ in discu~sing [",lilies, 
Individuals were asked how often lhey discuss politic> with friends. To me,~';Ure 









Q""'ion: When you loa 1000flllfr wilh your jhmd,< ~nd family, would ) "0" '''l-' you dim",,< polili('al 
"lalla., a) N .... ·"· b) Orca<ionally ci F>-~quemly di Don " ~'1I0W 
27% of respondent imlicnted thnt they ne\ er di,cuss.ed politics with friends while 53% 
occ:t~ion~lly di>cu~~ polilic> with li;~nd, ,~,,] 21% fr~yuently di,cus, politics (Fig 
33), The ~\ idenc~ show, thnl Ulere is a hi gh k\e! of di,cus,ion of politics ",ith friends. 
The oth~r measur~ of cognitive engagement con,i~ts of Ul~ !eYe! of interest in public 
aibir~, As ~ r~sull ofth~ pobJi,~d climate ,md the h~r,h economic en"ironment, one 
would ~xpecl n huge interest in "comprehending the nwnifold ways in which their 
lives are alTecl~d by decisions made by di ,t,~ll power hold~rs" (Bratton. ct a!, 2005. 
p,1(3). On the oth~r h~nd one might exped to iii,,] high levels of apathy as a result of 
pcopk' ~ inability to a~rcise agency. 
The evidence sl",ws that the political downturn within I.imbahwe ha, nol signi ncant ly 
increased 01' decreased th~ inkr~st in politic.', (a~ illu.',trated in Fig 34). 
", The,e i< 0 , uffici.nt co".lation (I'ear."n', ,- ~Z1") ,00 rciiabilit), (C",nbaeh Alph' 6S) l>ct,,"en 
the items to WOlnnt th. creotiC'n of" two it. m ,,,"rage "umtruet of "ugn',tiYe "ngagement l>ct" een 










Fi~uro .H: Ro'pondont, interested ill I'~~lie athi,." in Lim ba~'H' ~OO5 
Interest in Public Affairs 
Q""sliol1: How mlere,Hed would you JOy yO" ace iN ,,,,blie "tt;,i,,,' ( You kNOW, iii po/ilh\< alld 
W"'emme"'! a) ,vI" at all i1l/t','es/fd b! No< VU)' inle,..""d cj Somewh,,/ mM'e.1ed d, Vel) inM'eSied e' 
n()" 'I kllo~ 
22% "rlhi;' respondo;nts indiealo;d th"llhere Wi;'ro; vo;ry inkro;skr.i in public "fliJirs, 35%, 
of the rcsponr.icnts wCrC somewhal int.;rcslcd in public " Ilairs anr.i 43'% of lho; 
respondcnts Were not inlcrcSled in pllblic alTairs_ The highesl number orro;spondents 
indicated they ",Cre not inlcrested in polili~~_ 'I h~ possible ro;ason fl)r tIns is st"le 
repression has rClllkro;d th o;m IlK) sc~red 10 di scuss lho;so; jssoes, or this repression has 
dissipatcd in tcrest in public arfairs. A bivan~k corrda(jon cognitiw ~ng"gen""nt is 
poSili\cly rcialed (0 prolesl par(ieip~lion (Po;~rson R of .181**)_ This iadic~tes that 
individuals interested in public alTairs arC morC hkely to proks!. 
8.2 Muitivariatr Regression '1odrl Cugnitive Al\ureness amll'rotest 
Cogni tive f..1CtorS as a ",hole a<:C()l1nt ror 1()'% orlho; v~rianco; on the regr~ssion model 
The \ariablc with strong e,~pJanalOry power in lh~ moclel reialo;s (0 lad of trust in 
lh~ go\'~mlTl~n l medi" (\'ith ~ Lkt ~ of -. 154) followcd by thc educalion kId or 
respond~n!s (wi lh ~ Rel~ of .\35) mld r~spond~nts< kvds of cogniti\'c cngagelllcm 











R " [leta ~t ~ Slgn!tlca ncc 
Cons tan t .1 :18 .159 
Co ni t ive En"J 'ement .181·· . 1 )5 .134 .000 
MerliJ cxpo~ure .222u .042 .05 I .18<:1 
T rm l in guvernment -.200'· -.125 -.154 ••• 
newspapers 
Trust In lmjep"nd.;111 .14r" .077 .090 .009 
new, " '" F. duCJ (iul1 .227' · .US!! .1 3 5 .000 
A<i)uwd R Squ(lre ((1)18) In J 112) 
In coneJu"ion. 111~", mulls are w nsiswm ,~i ( h thl: ul iJPnal hypolhc>;i.~ r>f thi~ d}; Ip1~T. 
[ he (-\'idC11t:1.'" ~Jvy.\., ,11.1' indl\'idU31~ " ho U~ mol"<' cognilh-d~ en~3~o:d untl ha'-e 
more c)'po:.."., 10 the med i:J. arc mure (ihl~ 10 protest. 11 alsO ",t'lTI)hor.u",> tllo:-













The prevIOus chapters established theoretical explanations for protest potential 
through bivariate correlation and multivariate analysis of influencing factors .. This 
chapter examines the simultaneous impact of these factors. The table below (Fig 35) 
represents a linear regression model that tests the impact of five sets of factors on 
protest potential. The first and second columns contains the standardised regression 
coefficients (Beta) for each independent variable. The negative and positive sign with 
each coefficient indicates the direction of the relationship. Non significant effects 
mean the two variables are not at all connected. In the last row the sample size (n) and 
the total explained variance (Adjusted R Square) of the model on the dependent 
variable is presented. Models one and two show the effect of adding all five 
explanations. . Model one illustrates the effects of economic, political, cognitive, 
cultural and collective action dilemma factors on protest potential. Model 2 drops all 
statistically insignificant indicators to obtain a more accurate estimate of Adjusted R 
square and a more parsimonious model 
The model explains 28% of the variance in protest potential. The explanation that is 
most significant on the model is the collective action dilemma factor. The least 
significant model uses political explanations. The individual items that are most 
important in the model are employment (.238), education (.149); belonging to a 
professional organization (.201), identifying with the opposition party (.186) and 
Diaspora support (.092). These factors motivate protest participation and they are 
positively related to protest. The individual items that reduce protest potential and are 
negatively related to protest are absolute deprivation (-157), belief in the freeness of 
elections (-166), trust in government newspapers (-158), respect for the rule of law (-
227), residential residential location (-159), belonging to a religious group or being 











9.1 Economic Explanations 
The evidence reveals that absolute deprivation (-157) has a negative effect on protest 
potential. Having employment (.238) and receiving money from the Diaspora (.092) 
are positively related, that is these factors increase protest potential. Chapter 4 
discussed the causes of absolute deprivation - the high cost of living, hyperinflation 
and unemployment. The evidence of the expressed inability by respondents facing 
absolute deprivation to protest could be a result of the economic meltdown which has 
immobilised political participation. The severe hardships might have resulted in 
people devising survival strategies for enduring the harsh economic environment 
(Hirschman 1970). The result contradicts Gurr's thesis that relative deprivation spurs 
protest participation. (Gurr, 1970) The model indicates that relative deprivation is 
insignificant and has less explanatory power. Similarly, absolute deprivation is strong 
but dissuades protest action. 
The other significant factor related to economic explanations is employment. Being 
employed is positively related to protest and has more explanatory power in the model 
(with a Beta of .238). Conventional wisdom dictates that unemployed people are 
more likely to protest as a result of frustration by their economic and political 
powerlessness. A possible explanation for the opposite finding is that a working 
environment enables sharing of information related to public affairs which the 
unemployed might not have access to. The absence of mobilising structures among 
the unemployed also exacerbates their inability to protest. In contrast, workplaces are 
easy platforms for mobilising people to participate in civil disobedience on bread and 
butter related issues. The other interpretation is that unionised labour is a common 
feature in urban areas where the culture of protest is strong among the worker. The 
Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) heightened the propensity to protest in 
individuals because of previous organised protest and stayaways against price 
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9.2 Political Explanations 
As discussed in Chapter 6, protest action can be triggered by perceptions that public 
institutions and structures will accomodate people voicing their concerns (Meyer and 
Minkoff, 2004). People can protest if political channels are closed and people want to 
push for them to be opened (Dalton and Sickle, 2005). The evidence from Zimbabwe 
reveals that individuals who are dissatisfied with the lack of freeness of the elections 
are less likely to protest. This variable is negatively related (with a Beta of -166). The 
evidence is inconsistent with the literature that states that individuals who perceive the 
supply of democracy to be inadequate are more likely to protest. The lack of interest 
in protesting expressed by respondents who perceive the traditional channels to be 
closed is possibly because of their feelings of inadequacy to change the situation 
either by voting or protesting. 
The evidence shows the weaknesses of opposition parties and civil society In 
mobilising resistance around human rights violations. This strategy has only served to 
strengthen the people's resolve not to protest as a result of the risks involved. The 
model illustrates that variables such as supply of democracy, personal freedoms, 
responsiveness of leaders and perceptions of the freeness of elections are statistically 
insignificant and have very limited explanatory power related to protest potential in 
Zimbabwe. 
9.3 Cognitive Explanations 
The political science literature argues that cognitive awareness Increases protest 
potential. The findings reveal that cognitive engagement and high education levels are 
positively related to protest, that is increase protest potential. Trust in government 
newspapers is negatively related, that is reduces protest potential, while trust in 
independent newspapers increases protest potential (with a Beta of .149).People who 
show low levels of trust in government newspapers are also less likely to protest (with 











In assessmg the relationship between education and protest, the evidence from 
Zimbabwe shows that there is a strong significant relationship between an individual's 
level of education and protest participation (with a Beta of .149). Educated people 
have a higher propensity to protest, regardless of whether they are subjected to state 
propaganda and massive repression. This is because they have avenues of accessing 
information other than state channels. The less educated might not be able to discern 
between exercising their rights and committing a crime possibly because they are not 
exposed to other sources of news such as the independent media. 
9.4 Collective Action Dilemma 
Zimbabweans' general inability to protest has been attributed to fear and the risks 
associated with participating in protest. The literature argues that for one to overcome 
the collective action dilemma one has to belong to a group which helps in overcoming 
the fear (Bratton et al 2005). The evidence shows that individuals who belong to a 
professional or business association are more likely to protest (with a Beta of .201). A 
possible explanation for this is that most people who are involved in business and 
professional organisations have still been hard hit by the country's economic 
problems. Surprising is the statistical insignificance of belonging to a trade union or 
farmer's union and community development organisation as possible determinants of 
protest. These are grassroots organisations which previously provided support for 
opposition politics in Zimbabwe and members of these organisations should have had 
a high propensity to protest. The opposition politics in Zimbabwe has a strong labour 
background which provided most of the membership of the MDC. It would be 
expected that belonging to a trade union enables one to be exposed to current bread 
and butter issues. However, the closure of most companies in Zimbabwe due to the 
economic meltdown led to the growth of the informal sector therefore most of the 
people no longer belong to trade unions. These people now form part of the informal 
sector, such as cross boarder traders and vendors. This could explain why the labour 
organisation influence is insignificant 
However, belonging to a religious group reduces the chances of one protesting (with a 
Beta of -.098). This might be as a result of teachings of piety and loyalty to leadership 











The results in the model confirm notions that the reason why Zimbabweans are not 
protesting is related to fear of government reprisals, as this is statistically significant 
(with a Beat of .147). The repression in Zimbabwe has benefited the current 
government as it has deterred people from embarking on any form of resistance 
9.5 Cultural Factors 
The literature argues that culture can deter protest. (Almond and Verba, 1963). The 
African culture has been associated with limiting individual Zimbabwean's 
participation in protest as people respect their leader as their father. The model reveals 
that variables that have a negative and significant explanatory power are if 
respondents have respect for the rule of law and if they live in a rural area (with a 
Beta of -.227) and -.159 respectively). The evidence is consistent with what is in the 
literature, where rural areas in Zimbabwe are viewed as homogenous and the people 
in these areas are more likely to vote for the ruling party. These results are consistent 
with electoral trends in Zimbabwe that have resulted in the opposition winning both 
parliamentary and local government elections in the urban areas 
Previous Afrobarometer surveys show that urbanites express greater support for 
democracy. In the case of Zimbabwe less interest in protesting in urban areas might 
possibly be as a result of the repressive nature of the state which has clamped down 
on the people to an extent that it has reduced interest in participating in protests. Lack 
of interest in participating in protest in the rural areas on the other hand might be 
explained in the context of the events of the last five years that has seen engineered 
pro ZANUPF and anti MDC demonstrations mushrooming. This involved the bussing 
of people from rural areas to urban areas at times in the name of defending 
sovereignty or fighting the British. There is a need to explore individual 
understanding of protesting in contrast to the demonstrations that are at times stage 
managed by politicians and powerful people in society. It might also be necessary for 












Zimbabweans are not risk takers, people want to wait for the outcome of a 
process andjoin in the celebration ... you expect the leadership of the MDC to 
be battered on your behalf while you sit in the comfort of your own homes. 
This is a struggle that we need to join in because with only the MDC, ZCTU, 
NCA and without you the masses we will not realise that dream of seeing the 
regime out of power. 
MDC Secretary General Tendai Biti addressing the Public on the New Zimbabwe on 
27 September 2007 in Harare 
This study sought to examine the factors that determine protest participation III 
Zimbabwe. Drawing from the literature it explored the impact of economic, political 
cultural, collective action dilemma and cognitive awareness explanations using micro 
level analysis of cross sectional survey results from Round 3 of the Afrobarometer 
survey collected through personal interviews in August and October 2002 in 
Zimbabwe. 
Protest in Zimbabwe, based on the evidence from this study, is class based. The 
individuals who are most likely to protest are the educated, professionals, the 
urbanized and the economically secure. This could possibly explain why there are few 
people participating in protest. Professional groups, while predisposed to protest, have 
been dramatically reduced due to massive migration to the Diaspora and are now thus 
in the minority. The poor and down- trodden are not willing to protest. The reason for 
these class differences might be that civic society and opposition parties have possibly 
alienated the poor through their strategies. The results from this study raise questions 
with regard to the levels of trust shown in the leadership of civil society organisations 
and opposition groups. A previous study by Leysens (2004), carried out using 
Afrobarometer Round 1 data, arrived at similar conclusions. He concluded that the 
inability of the marginalised to confront the regime is an indication that: 
Mugabe's government will in all probability not be threatened by a popular 
revolt of Zimbabwe's impoverished and marginalised population ... even the 
most arduous circumstances will not necessarily translate into inclinations 
towards pushing for economic and political transformation. It might mean that 
Zimbabweans are more inclined to engage the state on a tactical basis, in order 











As stated earlier, the role and efficacy of civil society and opposition groups needs to 
be revisited. Current civil society leaders in Zimbabwe have been labelled more as 
'desktop" or dot com activists. They are perceived as more concerned with getting 
media attention outside Zimbabwe instead of mobilising on the ground. Furthermore, 
most civic organisations are confined to urban areas and do not penetrate rural areas. 
The leadership is not visible at protest marches, only appearing at press conferences. 
The marginalised in Zimbabwe could have possibly lost confidence as they see very 
little benefit from opposition politics other than being pawns in the political game of 
power. The other possible demoralising factor is the apparent disunity within civil 
society where the struggle in Zimbabwe has been co -modified and privatised at the 
expense of the people. The disunity in Zimbabwean civil society has led to 
uncoordinated protest marches whose agenda is self serving, only serving to raise the 
profiles of the leaders and organisations abroad rather achieving anything for the 
collective good. For example, in the same month the NCA, WOZA and the ZCTU 
would call for protest action on related issues and expect to get support from the same 
constituency instead of pooling their human and financial resources to be more 
effective. 
The reasons for the divisions among opposition groups range from the quest for 
personal glory by leaders to the politics of accessing donor funds. Civic society 
leaders are accused of mostly being concerned with outcomes that enhance their 
visibility, such as the number of street protests organised, and how many times they 
are arrested, instead of dedicating more time to organising the protests. This lack of 
co-ordination in civil society has manifested in the failure to mobilise the 
impoverished. Most organisations organise their meetings in hotels, advertising in 
independent newspapers or on the internet. Unfortunately these channels have limited 
coverage and are out of reach for the marginalised. 
Zimbabweans might be docile and passive and appear to be waiting for a messiah to 
solve the crisis. This could be attributed to the absence of a culture of protesting 
however this is worsened by lack of capacity and the repressive nature of the regime 
To unlock the crisis there is need for massive training on methods of rebelling against 











explored are rent and rates boycotts and demand for better servIces from local 
communities. Massive street protests will only emerge through a consolidate process 
of community gains were people see the benefits of confronting the regime at a local 
level People need to be mobilised on bread and butter issues such as price increases, 
water shortage,s power cuts and increases in school fees. 
The current trend within civil society to call on protests for abstract issues such as 
human rights and democracy will not achieve their intended aims. There is need for 
opposition and civil society leaders to form structures from village level, within the 
low and high density areas across the country that train people on how to deal with 
local problems and ways to petition and mobilise for change and results. This might 
be difficult and it demands effort and resources but it is an opportunity that has to be 
explored. Leysens (2004) argues that it is difficult to mobilise and organise for 
political transformation when every day is a struggle to meet one's basic needs. 
Alternatively, if protest is class oriented and the majority are not willing to protest it 
possibly gives the civics and opposition no alternative but to focus on the SADC 
initiative to resolve the 7 year old crisis as a possible option, despite its serious flaws, 
instead of hoping for change through elections or protests within the country. 
Implications for Democracy 
The evidence in this study illustrates that the Zimbabwe's road to democratizations is 
far from being complete. While the electoral system is uneven, participation is 
confined to the middle class. If democracy is to take root in Zimbabwe more resources 
have to be invested in enabling the masses to demand accountable leadership. There is 
also a need to revisit the effectiveness of the current leadership within opposition 
groups and civil society and assess whether they have the capacity to mobilize people. 
Resources have been poured into Zimbabwe with very little or no success. 
It is time for opposition groups, civil society and other democratic forces outside and 
within Zimbabwe to revisit their strategies. The crisis in Zimbabwe raises questions 
regarding those who are driving the drive for democratization. Are they now only self 
serving and manipulating the crisis for personal gain through donor funding? Is the 











opposition and civil society leadership? Or have Zimbabweans devised alternative 
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Here is a list of actions that people sometimes take as citizens. For each of these, 
please tell me whether you, personally, have done any of these things during the past 
year. If not would you do this if you had the chance? 
A Attended a community meeting 
B Got together with others to raise an issue 
C Attended a demonstration or protest march 
D Taken part in a stay away 
1. Often 
2. Several times 
3. Once or twice 
4. Would if had the chance 
5. Would never do this 




Over the past year how often, if ever has you or anyone in your family gone without 
food, water, medical care, cooking fuel, without cash income, how often have you 
gone without school expenses for children? 
1) Never 
2) Just once or twice 
3) Several Times 




In general how do you rate your living conditions to those of other Zimbabweans? 















Looking ahead do you expect the Living conditions in twelve months to be? 








Do you have a job that pays cash income? Is it fulltime? And are you presently 
looking for ajob (even if you are presently working) 
1. No (not looking) 
2. No (looking) 
3. Yes part time (not looking) 
4. Yes ,part time (looking) 
5. Yes ,full time (not looking) 
6. Yes, full time (looking) 





Extent of Democracy 
Question 41 
In your opinion how much of a democracy is Zimbabwe today? 
1) Full Democracy 
2) A democracy with minor problems 
3) A democracy with major problems 
4) Not a democracy 
5) Do not understand question/do not understand what democracy is? 











Satisfaction with democracy 
Question 42 
Overall how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Zimbabwe? Are you 
1) Very satisfied 
2) Fairly satisfied 
3) Not very satisfied 
4) Not at all satisfied 
5) Zimbabwe is not a democracy 
Personal Freedoms 
Question 49 
Please tell me if the following things are worse or better than they were few years ago 
or are they about the same 
A Freedom to say what you think 
B Freedom to join any political organisation you want 
C Freedom to choose who to vote for without feeling pressured 
D The ability of ordinary people to influence what government does 




5) Much better 
Responsiveness 
Question 56 
How much of the time do you think the following try their best to listen to what 
people like you have to say? 
A Members of Parliament 
B Elected Local government Councillors 
1) Never 
2) Only Sometimes 
3) Often 
4) Always 
Free and fairness of elections 
Question 40 
On the whole how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national 
election held in 2005? 
1) Completely free 
2) Free and fair but with minor problems 
3) Not free and fair 
4) Do not understand question? 











Elections Result reflection of the voters views 
Question 70 
Think about how elections work in practise in this country. How well do elections 
A Ensure that the members of Parliament reflect the views of the voters? 
B Enable voters to remove from office leaders who do not do what the people want? 
1) Very well 
2) Well 
3) Not very well 




Who should be responsible for 
A Making sure that once elected members of Parliament do their jobs? 
B Making sure that once elected local government councilors do their jobs 
1) President and Executive 
2) The Parliament and local council 
3) Their political party 
4) The Voters 
5) Don't Know 
Rule of Law 
Question 44 
A) It is better to find a lawful solutions to problems even if it takes longer B) It is 
sometimes better to ignore the law and solve problems immediately using other means 
1) Agree very strongly with A 
2) Agree with A 
3) Agree with B 
4) Agree very strongly with B 
5) Agree with Neither 
6) Don't Know 
Age 
Question 1 

















What if anything would you do to try and resolve each of the following situations? 
A You were waiting for a government permit for license but keep encountering delays 
B Election officials left your name off the voters roll 
C You suspected a school or clinic official of stealing 
D The police wrongly arrested someone in your family 
E Someone wrongly seized your family'S land 
1) Don't worry things will be resolved given enough time 
2) Lodge complaint through proper channels or procedures 
3) Use connections with influential people 
4) Offer tip or bribe 
5) Join in public protest 
6) Other 
7) Nothing because nothing can be done 
Collective Action Dilemma 
Associational Life 
Question 26 
Now lam going to read a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one could 
you tell me whether you are an official leader an active member an inactive member 
or not a member 
A A religious Group 
B A trade Union or Farmers Association 
C A professional or Business Association 
D A community development or self help association 
1. Official leader 
2. Active member 
3. Inactive member 
4. Not a member 
Opposition identification 
Question 73 
Which party is that????? 
























During the campaign for the 2005 March Parliamentary Elections were you or any 











2. A few times a week 
3. A few times a month 
4. Less than once a month 
5. Never 
Interest in Public affairs 
Question 19 
How interested would you say you are in public affairs? 
1. Very interested 
2. Somewhat interested 
3. Not very interested 
4. Not at all interested 
5. Don't Know 
Question 20 


















Respondent's highest level of education 
1. Primary school completed 
2. Some secondary / school high school 
3. Secondary school/high school completed Post secondary qualifications other 
than university e.g. diploma or degree from tecknikon or college 
4. Some University 
5. University completed 
6. Post Graduate 
Trust in the media 
Question 50 
How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about 
them to say? 
L Government Newspapers 
M Independent Newspapers 
1. All of them 
2. Most of them 
3. Some of them 
4. None 











Appendix B: Variable Recodes 
All the transfonnation of the recodes done in this dissertation refer to valid responses. 
Missing data, refusals to answer, and cases where a question was not applicable are 
excluded from the calculation of any result employing basic or advanced statistical 
techniques in this study 
Economic Explanations 
Question 12 Absolute Deprivation Recoded Format 
(Original Format) 
4 = Always 1 =Always 
3 = Many Times l=Always 
2 = Several Times 2=Several Times 
1 = Just Once or Twice 2=Several Times 
0= Never 3=Never 
9 = Don't Know 3=Never 
Question 7 (Relative Deprivation Recoded Format 
5= Much Worse 1 =Worse 
4 = Better 3=Better 
3 = Same 2=Same 
2 = Worse l=Worse 
1 = Much Worse l=Worse 
9 = Don't know 9=Worse 
Question 9 (Future Expectations) Recoded Format 
5 = Much better 3=Better 
4 = Better 3=Better 
3 = Same 2=Same 
2 = Worse l=Worse 
1 = Much worse l=Worse 
9 = Don't Know 9=Worse 
Question 82 Employment Recoded Format 
O=No not looking O=Unemployed 
1 =No looking O=Unemployed 
2=Yes part time (not looking) l=Employed 
3= Y es part time (looking) l=Employed 
4= Y es full time (not looking) l=Employed 
5= Yes full time ( looking) l=Employed 











Question Urban IRural Recoded Format 
1 =Urban I=Urban 
2=Rural 2=Rural 
Political Explanations 
Question 42 (Satis/action with Recoded Format 
Democracy) 
4 = Very satisfied 2=Satisfied 
3 = Fairly satisfied 2=Satisfied 
2 = Not very satisfied 1 =Not satisfied 
1 = Not at all satisfied 1 =Not satisfied 
o = Zimbabwe is not a democracy O=Zimbabwe not a democracy 
9 = Do not know 9=Zimbabwe not a democracy 
Question 49 (Personal Freedom) Recoded Format 
5 = Much worse I=Worse 
4 = Better 3=Better 
3=Same 2=Same 
2=Worse I=Worse 
1 = Much worse I=Worse 
9 = Don't Know 9=Worse 
Question 56 (Responsiveness) Recoded Format 
3 = Always 3=Always 
2 = Often 2=Sometimes 
1 = Only sometimes 2=Sometimes 
0= Never I=Never 
Question 40 Elections Free and Recoded Format 
Fairness 
4 = Not free and fair O=Not free and fair 
3 = Free and fair with major problems 1 =Free and fair with problems 
2 = Free and fair but with minor problems 1 =Free and fair with problems 
1 = Completely free and fair 2=Free and fair 
8 = Do not understand question 8=Not free and fair 
9 = Don't know 9=Not free and fair 
Question 70 (Effectivenss of Elections) Recoded Format 
3 = Very well 3=Well 
2 = Well 3=Well 
1 = Not very well 2=Not very well 












Question 69 (Accountability) Dummy Recoded Format 
3 = The voters l=Voters 
2 = Political Party O=Other 
1 = Parliament and Local Council O=Other 
o = President and the Executive O=Other 
9 = Don't know Q=Other 
Question 44 (Rule of Law) Recoded Format 
5 = Agree with neither 2=Agree with neither 
4 = Agree very strongly with B 1 =Agree with B to ignore law and use 
other means to solve problems 
3 = Agree with B 1 =Agree with B to ignore law and use 
other means to solve problems 
2 = Agree with A 3=Agree with A to use lawful solutions 
to solve problems 
1 = Agree very strongly with A 3=Agree with A to use lawful solutions 
to solve problems 
9 = Don't Know 2=Agree with neither 










9=00n't Know 9=Other 













Collective Action Dilemma 
Question 26 Associational Life Recoded Format 
3 = Official Leader 3=Officialleader 
2 = Active member 2=Active member 
1 = Inactive member 1 =Inactive member 
0= Not a member O=Not a member 
9 = Don't know O=Not a member 
Question 47 Careful of what you say Recoded Format 
3 = Always O=Always 
2 = Often I=Rarely 
1 =Rarely I=Rarely 
o =Never 2=Never 
9 =Don't know 2=Never 
Question 48 Forced to Vote Recoded Format 
2=No 2=No 
1 =Yes I=Yes 
9 =Don't know I=Yes 
Question 73 Identify with opposition Recoded Format 
440=ZANU PF O=Other 
442=ZANU NDONGA 1 =Opposition 
443=ZUD 1 =Opposition 
444=ZIYA 1 =Opposition 
445=NAGG 1 =Opposition 
995=OTHER 1 =Opposition 
999=Don't know 1 =Opposition 
Cognitive awareness 
Q18 Media exposure Recoded Format 
4 =Everyday 3=Everyday 
3 = A few times a week 2= A few times a week 
2 = A few times a month 1 = A few times a month 
1 =Less than a month 1 = A few times a month 
O=Never O=Never 
9 =Don't know O=Never 
Question 19 Interest in public affairs Recoded Format 
3 =Very interested 2=Very interested 
2 =Somewhat interested 1 =Somewhat interested 
1 =Not very interested 0= Not at all interested 













o =Never O=Never 
9= O=Never 




0= No formal schooli 
99 = Don't know 
Question 50J Trust in government Recoded Format 
3= A lot 
O=Not at all 
Trust in Independent Recoded Format 
4=Often 
3=Several Times 
2=Once or Twice 
1 =Would if had a chance 
O=Would never do this 
O=Would never do this 
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